Foreign threat:

The Japanese National Police Agency, globalized crime and security
Summary

The advent of globalization has been perceived as both opportunity and threat in Japan. Some argue that the relaxation of border controls and increased migration are solutions to imminent labor shortages faced by a rapidly aging Japanese society. Others argue that with globalization come serious threats to security, and most recently attention has turned to the threat posed by the globalization of crimes. In 2010, the Japanese National Police Agency published its annual White Paper on the Police with a special feature titled “Globalization of Crimes and Police Efforts”. Drawing on securitization theory, this paper aims to study the NPA’s construction of globalized crime in relation to securitization. This is attempted through an exploration of the NPA’s 2010 White Paper from a perspective of securitization, with the objective to grasp the image of globalized crime constructed and to discuss whether it is fitting to speak of a securitizing move in connection to the report. The exploration is expanded through an investigation into the way that the threat image is constructed, specifically relating the construction strategy to prevalent discourses in Japan.

I find that the NPA’s description of the threat of globalized crime includes securitizing language. The report can be interpreted as a securitizing move, but since the countermeasures proposed are partially implemented already, it does not simply seem to be an issue of securitization of a new threat. While the declared threat is nominally the globalization of crime, the real threat in the report seems to be crime committed by foreign nationals and by extension foreign nationals themselves. The addition of ‘globalized crime’ seems partly a way to further underline the danger that foreign nationals pose. The examination of the construction of the securitizing move underlines this. It yields a division into a passive Japanese ‘us’ that is attacked by an active foreign ‘them’. The dichotomy of foreignized criminality and nationalized safety is further strengthened by invocations of prevalent discourse on foreign criminality and national identity constructions that emphasize foreigners’ dangerous and criminal disposition and Japanese safety and homogeneity. In conjunction with the NPA’s prominent and influential position in society, these factors increase the potential persuasive power of the security move, which could affect the probability of success for the move. The way in which the NPA chooses to construct its statements on the globalization of crime could therefore have a real effect on the social reality in contemporary Japan.
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1. Introduction
In the last few decades, the world has seen an accelerated internationalization, spurred on by developments in information and communication technology as well as deepened economic cooperation. Japan, a nation that has long perceived itself as isolated, geographically as well as culturally and ethnically, is viewing the increasing globalization of the world with equal parts enthusiasm and apprehension. Globalization closes distances between nations, cultures and peoples, and enables exchanges and cross-border movement that enrich the lives of everyday people. However, the growing cross-border flows of trade and people enabled by globalization have also caused governments all over the world to turn their attention to new types of issues associated with these flows, such as transnational crime, irregular migration and terrorism.¹

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these issues – often dubbed the dark side or downside to globalization² – have increasingly replaced Cold War fears of invasion and military attacks, occasioning a decline in the relative importance of military security and a questioning of the primacy of military issues on states’ security agendas, and in their budgets.³ States as well as academics are talking of a broadened security agenda, in which there is room for non-military threats, and these new worries have increasingly been portrayed as in the realm of security policy.⁴ Since this means that issues that were previously framed as unthreatening are suddenly declared as threats, it opens up for discussions about why certain issues and not others become matters of national security. Proponents of widening the concept of security have pointed to the importance of language, showing how a rhetorical linking of an issue to security has the power to turn that issue into a threat and move it onto states’ security agenda: issues can become securitized.⁵

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the ensuing “war on terror” kept states focused on the threat to security posed by transnational terrorism, but recent years have seen a shift in attention.⁶ Many governments are now concerned that the freer transnational movement of information, goods, money and people accompanying globalization also risks throwing states open to transnational crime.⁷ Transnational criminal groups are increasingly described as serious threats to states’ security, even as “a greater international security challenge

¹ See e.g. Albanese (2011), pp. 1-2.
² Ibid., p. 1.
⁵ Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998); Sheehan (2005), p. 3.
than anything western democracies had to cope with during the Cold War.”

This concern about globalization and its impact on crime is present in Japan as well. The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) published a White Paper on the Police in 2010, which focused on this issue. In a section titled “Globalization of Crimes and Police Efforts”, the report emphasizes the threat that globalized crime poses to Japanese society. This signals that at least some Japanese actors, possibly echoing international discourse, are looking to discuss the link between globalization and crime not as a criminal policy issue but as a security issue. At one point in the White Paper, the NPA writes: "we hope this feature will help Japanese people become well aware of the serious threat of the ‘globalization of crimes’ to public security.” This could be interpreted as a sign that consensus on whether this type of crime constitutes a serious threat to security has not yet been reached. The report could therefore, I argue, be seen as an attempt to securitize the issue of transnational crime—that is, to give the issue political priority by linking it to national security policy.

Drawing on securitization theory, this thesis takes as its point of departure that there is no self-evident connection between an underlying condition and a perceived threat. An issue is threatening because it is declared as such in such a way, by such an actor and in such a context, that it is perceived as a threat. Perception of threat, research suggests, affects public opinion. It raises fear-levels and fosters punitive attitudes, and as a consequence has an indirect impact on legislation. Affecting change in the perception of issues, then, could be a way to lobby for changes in legislation. These changes in perception, while not necessarily the result of conscious strategy, could be achieved by rhetorically linking an issue to security. Research shows that once an issue is seen as a security threat, it becomes easier to motivate increased political attention to the issue area. This makes it important to examine the issues in a society that are framed as threats to security, and to investigate by whom, and in what way, this framing is performed.

The NPA is an influential institution often cited by Japanese media, politicians and other governmental authorities. It publishes its White Papers on the Police annually with the stated aim of not only providing its readers with insights into police activities but also, crucially, of helping to...
formulate future policies. It is this explicitly stated purpose of the NPA White Papers that, for me, makes it interesting and important to examine the images of societal phenomena that the NPA constructs. This nearness to policy formulation and decision-making, not to mention its authority on the subject of crime, grants the NPA a significant role in the shaping of societal discourse that warrants an examination of its security language. The aim of this paper is to study the NPA’s presentation of globalized crime from a perspective of securitization. This will be achieved through a qualitative content analysis of the NPA’s 2010 White Paper on the Police. In the course of this, I hope to be able to determine whether the White Paper can be seen as an attempt at securitization through an examination of the language used in the construction of globalized crime as a threat. I also aim to examine how the issue of globalized crime is persuasively constructed as a threat, and to see how the strategies used in the construction relate to the specific Japanese context.

1.1. Previous research
While traditionally seen as a law and order problem, there has been a gradual shift toward an idea of transnational crime as a security issue. There is disagreement about whether the issue is worthy of security attention but, following this shift, scholarship on transnational crime is increasingly treating it as a security concern. Much of this research is largely descriptive, which Mandel points out as typical of newly resurgent areas of investigation. He calls for more refined analysis, and aims to provide one in his monograph on transnational crime. However, his focus remains on the nature of transnational crime and how best to combat it, and he explicitly assumes that the issue poses a threat to security. This assumption is present in other works on transnational crime, both in general and specifically in the Asian context. My basic assumption, however, is that the link between the contextual condition and threat perception is not straightforward. Sjöstedt points out that there is a general lack of research that problematizes threat construction, and she calls for studies using the framework of securitization to problematize threat images.

The field of securitization is growing and securitization theory has been applied to a range of issues from migration and health issues to terrorism and transnational crime. Securitization theory was developed within the European context and the large majority of studies of securitization focus on

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18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 See e.g. Albanese (2011); Broadhurst & Le (2013); Laki (2006); Lin (2010).
21 See e.g. in order of issue mentioned, Vultee (2010); Huysmans (2006); Sjöstedt (2008); Emmers (2003); Stritzel (2012).
Europe or North America. It has been argued that when the framework is applied outside the Western context, it “becomes less capable of producing a comprehensive and empirically consistent security analysis” due to its assumption that “the Euro-American model of state and the accompanying political culture is valid globally.”22 Research on Asia suggests that securitization might indeed take a different form there. It has been remarked that the framework is inadequate to capture the problem of migration in South Asia, as studies show that securitizing language, even by high-ranking officials, does not necessarily lead to extraordinary measures.23 Emmers, studying ASEAN’s securitization of transnational crime, finds that while there is a securitizing rhetoric, the political response has not matched this. He concludes that, securitizing language notwithstanding, the actual securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia is far from clear.24 Muña also finds that while the framework of securitization is useful to study Asian security it is important to take the specific political context into account.25 The focus of these works is Southeast Asia, whereas Japan is situated within an East Asian context, but the conclusions are still interesting for this study.

There is quite a bit of research on the framing of crime in Japan. Shipper has examined the NPA’s role in construction of images of crime, and Yamamoto has shown how discourses on foreigners’ crime contribute to what she terms a ‘foreignization’ of crime and a ‘nationalization’ of security.26 However, neither approaches the issue from a perspective of securitization. Building on previous research, I hope to contribute to the research on threat construction through the investigation of the threat image of globalized crime. I also hope to contribute to research on securitization in general and Asian securitization in particular by studying securitization within the Japanese context.

1.2. Disposition
This paper consists of four sections. In section 2, I introduce the theoretical framework, outlining securitization theory and explaining how I use it in this paper. I also describe aspects of the Japanese context relevant to the application of securitization theory to my material. In section 3, I describe my material and outline the method used in this paper. I conduct a qualitative content analysis of the NPA’s 2010 White Paper on the Police, focusing on the special feature “Globalization of Crimes and Police Efforts”. In section 4, I present the results of my investigation and analysis. In the concluding section 5 I discuss my results, relating them to the Japanese context and to previous research on securitization and Asia.

22 Barthwal-Datta (2009), p. 278.
24 Emmers (20013), pp. 419-420. ASEAN is the acronym of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
26 Shipper (2005); Yamamoto (2004).
2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Security, security studies and a broadened security agenda

In classical security thinking, security is about survival.\(^{27}\) A security issue is something that poses an existential threat to a particular institution, usually the state. It is this life-or-death aspect of security threats that justifies extraordinary measures, such as the use of force and the reallocation of resources, in dealing with them.\(^{28}\) Security has traditionally been understood in military terms, as military prevention of external threats emanating from antagonistic states.\(^{29}\) The term security may have other uses—criminologists might see it in terms of police prevention of internal threats in the form of crime perpetrated by individuals or groups.\(^{30}\) Nevertheless, the main focus of security studies and of the policy area of national security has been the military sector and international relations, a conceptualization that fit well with the bipolar worldview of the Cold War era.\(^{31}\)

In the post-Cold War era, however, many states turned their attention to new types of issues such as economic stability, increasing migration flows, terrorism and environmental pollution. This development made it increasingly apparent that the traditional definition of security as a matter of military threats was too narrow to deal with the array of emerging issues seen and declared as security threats. A broadened security agenda, proposed by Barry Buzan and encompassing not only military threats but also threats to political, economic, societal and environmental security quickly gained ground.\(^{32}\) This reconceptualization allowed for a wider range of issues to be understood and analyzed as part of the security agenda, and further made it possible to argue for the inclusion of non-military issues in states’ security agendas, and thus in their budgets.\(^{33}\)

The inclusion of non-traditional issues in the security agenda is, however, not uncontroversial and has sparked intense debates about whether the expansion is analytically useful or simply runs the risk of "expanding ‘security studies’ excessively […] [and would] destroy its intellectual coherence."\(^{34}\) The central question in the debate has been that of the link between different types of

\(^{28}\) Sheehan (2005), pp. 52-53.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., pp. 5-6.
\(^{30}\) This division between internal and external has always to some extent been artificial. There were instances of transnational crime such as trafficking or piracy long before the last few decades’ internationalization, and the actions of military and police have not always been strictly confined to the international or the domestic arena, respectively. The academic disciplines have, however, largely refrained from blurring the lines. Cf. Loader & Percy (2012).
\(^{32}\) This broadened, multisector security agenda was introduced by Buzan, Barry (1991).
\(^{33}\) Sheehan (2005), p. 3.
\(^{34}\) Walt cited in Sjöstedt (2010), p. 16.
threats in different sectors that allows them to be conceived of in terms of security. What
distinguishes security issues from ‘simple’ problems? Why are certain issues seen as threats and
brought onto the security agenda? A solution to this problem is offered by those who view security
as a socially constructed concept that receives its specific meaning within a specific context.\footnote{Sheehan (2005), p. 3.} The
link between security issues is the use of language, the designation of an issue as a security threat.
This is the basis of one fast-growing theoretical framework within security studies – securitization.

2.2. Securitization theory
Conceived of by the so-called Copenhagen School\footnote{The theoretical framework is most famously articulated in Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde’s \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis}.}, securitization theory rests on the constructivist assumption that there is no simple or self-evident connection between an underlying condition ‘out
there’ and the framing of that condition. The assumption is a move away from traditional views on
security policy and threats, which have held that threat perceptions of an issue are inextricably
linked to the contextual condition; an issue is on the security agenda because it constitutes a real
threat. This traditional stance has been criticized for not problematizing the concept of threats or the
process through which certain issues, but not others, become perceived as security threats.\footnote{Sjöstedt (2010), p. 19.}
Constructivists, instead, hold that descriptions of reality – such as the framing of an issue as a threat
to security – are not simply reflections of the world, they are also constitutive of social reality in the
sense that they construct a perception of the issue in question, which forms the basis of future conduct.\footnote{Sheehan (2005), p. 3.} For Buzan et al., security issues are constructed through a process of securitization. The
invocation of ‘security’, with its connotations to existential threats and military interventions, takes
politics beyond established rules and frames an issue as above politics.\footnote{Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998), p. 23.} By presenting an issue as
an existential \textit{threat to a referent object}, a \textit{securitizing actor} ”declares an emergency condition, thus
claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development”\footnote{Ibid., p. 21.}. In this
framework, security is seen as a speech act, which includes the ”designation of an existential threat
requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a
significant audience”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.} Through this speech act a phenomenon is turned into a security issue – it is
securitized and can be moved onto the security agenda.

By emphasizing that whether or not an issue is constructed as a threat and becomes securitized is
not contingent on some objectively underlying condition, the Copenhagen School conceptualization invites analyses of how, why and by whom securitization of an issue occurs. If threat images are not objective representations of an underlying condition, then that condition can also be understood and reacted upon differently. For instance, a foreign tank can be construed as a military threat of invasion or as a solution to a conflict (as part of a peace-keeping force), and the range of available reactions to the appearance of the tank will be highly dependent upon the construal. This makes the choice to securitize a political choice. An actor with the ability to bring about securitization, thereby affecting perceptions of an issue and effecting policy change, consequently holds considerable power. To analyze securitization, then, also becomes an important part of the analysis of power relations within a society.

2.2.1. Process of securitization
In securitization, it is not simply the uttering of the word security that is important. Rather it is “the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.” 42 This implies that there is a process of securitization that begins with a threat designation accompanied by special measures intended to counter the threat. The next step is the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience, which clears the way for the implementation of the proposed special measures. If a type of threat is persistent or recurrent, the response and sense of urgency can become institutionalized, e.g., the build-up of bureaucracies, procedures and military establishments to deal with long-term military threats of invasion and war. Once securitization of an issue is accepted, there is no longer the same need for dramatic rhetoric when speaking of the issue; by mentioning ‘defense’, there is also an implicit ‘security’ and ‘urgency’. The security argument, or logic, becomes taken for granted, and is reproduced by security practices: the state of emergency is firmly established and accepted, and the securitization has become institutionalized. 43 This can be contrasted with the early phase of securitization, which Buzan et al. call ad hoc securitization, when the issue is actively presented as existentially threatening and the securitizing actors are trying to legitimize policy measures to counter it. 44 The process of securitization, then, cannot be said to be complete until the audience has accepted the designation of threat. Before there are signs of this acceptance, there can only be talk of a securitizing move on the part of the securitizing actor. 45

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2.2.2. Beyond the Copenhagen School
The Copenhagen School conceptualization is highly actor-centered, implying that by declaring an issue as an existential threat, a single securitizing actor can create a new social reality. It is through the self-referentiality of the securitizing actor’s speech act that the new reality is made possible: by saying it something is done. The Copenhagen School therefore recommends that securitization should be studied by analyzing discourse\(^{46}\), which would indeed capture the speech acts of securitizing actors. However, Buzan et al. also stress the intersubjective nature of the process in claiming that securitization is affected by ‘facilitating conditions’ and must be accepted by the audience to succeed.\(^{47}\) As critics have pointed out, the Copenhagen School, despite this emphasis, tends to neglect the role of facilitating conditions, such as the institutional context of the securitizing actors and the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, in the success of securitization.\(^{48}\) Balzacq, one of the so-called second generation of securitization scholars who advocate a more sociological approach to securitization, sees these factors as just as important and calls for their inclusion in analyses.\(^{49}\) I will therefore adopt a broader conceptualization of securitization, which understands securitizing speech acts as embedded in the political, societal and institutional context in which they are made.

A securitizing move can be conceived of as an attempt at persuasion. A securitizing actor wishes to convince a significant audience to accept its perception of an issue as a security threat, an acceptance which would legitimize the measures that the securitizing actor sees as necessary to counter the threat. As stated above, the Copenhagen School tends to see the security language of the securitizing speech act as in itself enough to induce audience agreement. Balzacq argues that in order for a threat image to be accepted by a significant audience it is not enough that the rhetoric catalyzes a sense of urgency through the invocation of security.\(^{50}\) He calls for a discursive analysis of securitization that includes, but is also lifted above, the textual level and that accounts for the capacity of security utterances to bring about something desired by the speaker.\(^{51}\) He argues for the importance of logic of persuasion, or a persuasive power, in security utterances. The power of a securitizing move to persuade its audience will depend on three factors. Firstly, the contextual power position of securitizing actors will affect the persuasive power of their utterances. This factor takes into account the context in which the securitizer acts and its power position in relation to the

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 31-33; McDonald (2008), pp. 572-573.
\(^{49}\) See Balzacq (2011).
\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 27.
audience. Securitization of an issue takes place within a field of power, in which the securitizer is not the only actor. There may be several competing interpretations of an issue and discursive struggle over definition. Due to their political capital, asymmetric access to information and privileged access to the media, public officials would find it relatively easy to push their interpretation, in this case to securitize an issue.\(^{52}\) This increased probability of success is what makes it especially interesting to study the securitizing moves made by dominant public officials.

Secondly, the persuasive power will depend on discursive strategy, that is on the way in which a securitizer can convey how "critical a problem is, how it matters to the audience(s), and point to the consequences".\(^{53}\) The securitizing actor might use different strategic techniques, for instance analogies, metaphors and stereotypical descriptions, which could all work to facilitate the mobilization of the audience.\(^{54}\) Thirdly, Balzacq understands persuasive power as dependent upon the relative validity of the statements for which the acquiescence of the audience is requested, meaning that the audience will ascertain the claims of public officials against clues coming from the ‘real world’.\(^{55}\) This should not be understood in the sense that these ‘clues from reality’ would mean that security claims need to mirror an actual situation, as that would constitute a move back towards the more traditional view of security threat images as prompted by actual and objectively threatening conditions ‘out there’. The merit of the Copenhagen School framework of security is its decoupling of underlying condition from threat image and the insistence that through language any and all issues can be framed as security threats. This conceptualization allows for investigations of the way that an issue is constructed as a security issue, through the specific security language used by certain actors. The Copenhagen School emphasizes the importance and constitutive role of discourse, and it is a contextualization on this level that is relevant to the understanding of a securitizing move. The relative validity of security statements is not based on clues coming on from some physical, actual and objective situation, but on clues originating in societal discourse. A securitizing move that is in line with existing societal discourse should arguably have greater success than one that attempts to securitize an issue that has not yet received attention. This dialogue with pre-existing discourses could be a conscious part of the discursive strategy of the securitizing move, or it could be unconscious, since the securitizing actor not only influences but is also influenced by societal discourse.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 26.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 36.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 26.
2.2.3. Identity in securitization

The broadened security agenda includes a conceptualization of a ‘societal sector’ of security that concerns the relationship of security to collective identity. Since the object of much of securitization studies is some part of the state, this collective identity is often the national identity (although it could also conceivably be smaller groups’ identities that are at stake). While we tend to think of nations as fixed entities on the international arena, Anderson has famously conceived of them not as self-evident because of some shared geography, but as imagined communities. A collective identity, such as national identity, is a “socially constructed collective separated from other socially constructed collectives by some form of ideational border (cultural, historical, ideological, etc.)”. Identities affect interests and constrict actions of individuals, but since they are socially constructed that are also malleable and open to reconstruction. Collective identities are constructed in two ways. Groups identify themselves with reference to certain qualities and characteristics that they share, through positive identification. Importantly, they also identify themselves through negative identification, with reference to what they are not or in opposition to another group. Said has argued that negative identification tends to play a larger role than its positive counterpart, with the Self defined more by what one is not, through a process of ‘Othering’, than by what one is.

Securitization can be a way to designate Self and Other; through the finding and declaration of security threats, national identity can be constructed and maintained. By triggering specific perceptions of an issue or a specific Other, identity constructions work to facilitate, or inhibit, successful securitization. The invocation of identities, like existing discourses, can be used as part of the discursive strategy of securitizing moves. A securitizing actor wishing to persuade an audience can use its understanding of that audience’s collective identity in threat formulation to persuade it to accept the securitization. This invocation is, however, not necessarily a conscious strategy – as with discourse, the securitizing actor is both influencing and influenced by societal ideas of collective identities. Importantly, the socially constructed nature of identity means that while it is constitutive of the interests and actions of individuals, and can be invoked, it is also constituted by language, and can be reconstructed through the invocation.

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59 Stivachtis (2008), p. 3.
61 Sjöstedt (2010), pp. 34-35. For a study on how identity constructs can work to facilitate or inhibit securitization, see: Sjöstedt (2008).
2.3. The Japanese context
Before going into the method used in this paper, I present an outline of the Japanese context in which this report is published. This context serves as a backdrop to the analysis that I conduct and includes background information that is necessary in the application of theory to the material used.

2.3.1. Discourses on globalization, crime and identity
As mentioned in the introduction, the advent of globalization is perceived as both opportunity and threat in Japan. Some argue that relaxation of border controls and increased international migration are the solution to labor shortages faced by a rapidly aging Japanese society. Others perceive the same development as a serious threat. When seen in this light, globalization is commonly linked to rises in crime, the ‘decay’ of society, an undermining of the traditional way of life and specific morals that this is though to entail. Immigrants are often described as criminal Others, who will not only negatively affect social order but will also dilute a perceived national homogeneity.62 This purported link between immigration and crime is not new – nor unique to Japan – and it has repeatedly been claimed that immigrants have a heightened propensity for crime as compared to Japanese.63 Despite evidence suggesting that immigrants have a lowered propensity for crime than do native Japanese64, the notion that immigration is causally linked to spikes in crime rates continues to be perpetuated in Japanese media and on the political level.65 This notion is part of a larger foreign criminality discourse in Japanese society. This discourse depicts foreign nationals as predatory potential criminals prowling for Japanese victims and maintains that the characteristics of foreigners are signs of their innately heightened propensity for crime. The discourse reinforces images of foreign Others as the cause of disorder and crime and of Japan as originally crimeless and safe.66 This perception is prevalent in Japan, and is reflected in victimization surveys in which the Japanese report high levels of xenophobia and fear of foreigner crime.67

The foreign criminality discourse is especially salient to Japanese readers because it activates older, deep-set ideas of Japanese homogeneity, uniqueness and safety that have their basis in ideas of Japanese national identity known as nihonjinron. Nihonjinron, which translates to discussions/theories about the Japanese, has its roots in ideologies about the Japanese nation

62 Friman (2011); Shipper (2005); Yamamoto (2004).
64 Shipper (2005); Yamamoto (2010).
65 Kingston (2013); Menju (2012); Yamamoto (2012).
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and saw a resurgence of interest in the decades after World War 2.\(^{68}\) Among its central premises is that Japanese society is unique, safe, and that the Japanese are a homogeneous people constituting a racially unified nation.\(^{69}\) These ideas have been, and still are, informing an idea of Japaneseness, of Japanese collective identity.

2.3.2. The role of the NPA in Japanese society

The NPA’s White Papers are often used as one of the main sources in both non-Japanese and Japanese studies on crime. It has also been pointed out that the Japanese system of press clubs, which strive to “achieve mutual enlightenment and understanding between organisations and media companies”\(^ {70}\), encourages the spread of official perspectives in Japanese media.\(^ {71}\) The government can use these press clubs, through which officials give information to accredited journalists, to exert indirect influence over the media and since the press clubs use accreditation, giving them control over the access to government sources, they further help create a streamlined, state-backed take on the news.\(^ {72}\) As a consequence of this, but also because of a media tendency to print NPA data without scrutiny\(^ {73}\), the NPA’s influence on the media is considerable. Shipper, for instance, has demonstrated that press reports on foreigner crime correlate with police reports and that the headlines of major Japanese dailies closely reflect NPA White Papers.\(^ {74}\)

In addition to the academia and the media, the NPA stance on issues influences government policymaking. For the last couple of decades, police power within government has been increasing, with increasing numbers of police officers delegated to the Cabinet Secretariat and with NPA officials staffing two of the most important posts in the Secretariat. Furthermore, the NPA is intimately integrated with other ministries and agencies by frequent personnel exchanges, loans and transfers, interestingly sending out more of its staff than it is accepting into its own organization.\(^ {75}\) Finally, statements of the NPA tend to filter down to and become amplified by politicians.\(^ {76}\) The NPA is well aware of this fact, and it is indeed, as I have noted earlier, the explicit aim of its White Papers on the Police to help formulate future policies.\(^ {77}\)

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\(^{68}\) Burgess (2012).

\(^{69}\) Ibid.

\(^{70}\) Sriramesh & Takasaki (1999), p. 345.

\(^{71}\) Freeman (2000), pp. 60-61.


\(^{73}\) Shipper (2005), p. 318.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 319-320.

\(^{75}\) Katzenstein (1996), pp. 61-62.

\(^{76}\) Yamamoto (2004); Yamamoto (2007).

\(^{77}\) Finch (2010), pp. 238-239.
3. Research design: materials and method

3.1. Materials

The overarching aim of this paper, as stated above, is to study the Japanese National Police Agency’s (NPA) framing of globalized crime using securitization theory. This is done in order to achieve two related aims: to determine whether the NPA’s White Paper can be said to constitute a securitizing move and to discuss how the security statements in it relate to prevalent discourses in Japanese society. My primary material is the NPA’s 2010 White Paper on the Police.\(^{78}\) The White Paper on the Police is a translation of the Japanese original *Keisatsu Hakusho* (literally Police White Paper). Both language versions are prepared by the National Police Agency. The White Paper on the Police was first published in 1974 as a tool to help understand police activities and reported crime in Japan, and has been published annually since. In addition to statistical description of the overall crime situation, each White Paper includes a “special feature” which focuses on a specific issue, usually new crime trends or dramatic changes in crime rates.

The 2010 White Paper was published in July of 2010 and covers crime statistics of 2009. The 40-page special feature is the reason that this particular White Paper attracted my attention. The special feature is titled “Globalization of Crimes and Police Efforts” and serves as the main focus of this paper. The stated aim of the feature, according to the introduction, is to raise awareness among the Japanese people of the “emerging grave threat to public security” constituted by the influx of foreign criminality, and to show what the Japanese police is doing, and planning to do, to counter this threat.\(^{79}\) While this is the aim expressed in the feature, the White Papers on the Police are prepared and published with another specific aim, which should be taken into account. In the preface of the first published report, it is stated that the purpose of the White Paper on the Police is to provide the general public with insight into police activities and, crucially, to help formulate future policies.\(^{80}\) The aim of the 2010 report, it should be kept in mind, is not only to inform the public of ongoing practices but also to influence policy, and possibly legislation, in certain directions. This explicitly stated purpose, which implies nearness to policy formulation and decision-making, warrants an examination of the images of societal phenomena that are constructed through the NPA’s White Papers.


\(^{79}\) NPA (2010), p. 4.

\(^{80}\) Finch (2000), pp. 238-239.
The actual report may have been written by a handful of individuals, who could have their own private political goals and agendas. I argue that, apart from the explicit aim described above, the fact that the White Paper is published annually, is made readily available by the NPA and is widely cited by other government officials as well as the media, also makes it reasonable to assume that the organization can be seen as backing its content. I will therefore be analyzing the document as representing the views of a whole organization.

3.2. Method
I follow the Copenhagen Schools’ recommendation that securitization be analyzed through studies of discourse aimed at capturing the security language. Here, I do this through a qualitative content analysis of the report in order to grasp the image of globalized crime that is constructed, as well as the logic of persuasion of the construction. Since the aim is to capture the meaning of the text and how the phenomenon of globalized crime is described, a qualitative approach is suitable. In a traditional content analysis, passages in the text might have been codified and divided into categories based on specific words or phrases determined before processing the material. I have chosen not to designate a number of specific code words to look for, since such a focus might risk overshadowing other words that might be of importance. Furthermore, implied or implicit meanings might be difficult to capture with a narrow focus on specific words. A too fixed approach would also restrict the possibilities of looking at the context in which words appear.\textsuperscript{81} This would be counter to my aim, since in order to capture meanings I have to be able to see words in the sentences or even passages in which they appear. I have therefore chosen to approach the text guided by my theoretical framework and ordered the text into rough categories, but without specific predetermined code words. The purpose of the loose categories has been to structure the material and to serve as the basis for the ordering of the section on results and analysis. It should be noted that I have not adhered to any strict rules in the creation of the categories as they have been used mainly as a practical tool in the reading and processing of the text.\textsuperscript{82}

3.2.1. Processing of the material
After a first read-through, the material was ordered into two categories responding roughly to the two objectives: one regarding the text as a securitizing move, with focus on concepts drawn from securitization theory; and the other regarding the persuasive power of the language in the securitizing move. For the first category, I specifically looked for words and sentences in connection to the three main themes of a securitizing move: the referent object, the declared threat and the countermeasures proposed to combat it. In order to determine whether the report can

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Bergström & Boréus (2012), pp. 80-81.
\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Ibid., pp. 63-65.
justifiably be seen as a securitizing move, I also looked at whether it can be fitted into the securitization process. A securitizing move, following Sjöstedt, should emphasize the spatial scale, *immediacy* and *persistence* of the threat, and the *magnitude* of its consequences.\(^8^3\) In short, I note the *salience* of the threat to the referent object, and marked the proposed countermeasures.\(^8^4\) I have made note of the *frequency* with which the threat is stressed, adding a touch of quantitative analysis logic to my otherwise qualitative method. The reasoning behind this is an assumption that if the NPA chooses to mention the word ‘threat’ 10 times rather than once, this further underscores their securitizing attempt. The aim of my study is still an interpretation of both the explicitly and the implicitly expressed in the text, for which the qualitative approach is better suited, but by noting the frequency I hope to further add to my line of argument.

For the second category, following the additions to securitization theory proposed by Balzacq, I have not only looked at the securitizing language in the text, but also at the persuasive power visible through it. Passages related to the relative validity of the NPA’s statements and to its discursive strategy were marked. The meaning of the relative validity of statements is conceptualized to mean statements’ activation of existing societal discourses on identity and crime. The discursive strategy is the different strategic techniques that could work to facilitate audience acceptance of a securitizing move.\(^8^5\) For the analysis of the persuasive power, I have examined how the report relates to discourses in Japanese society. In this, I have specifically looked for the use of ‘us’ and ‘them’, designations of Self and Other, as this indicates identity construction at play. I have also marked stereotypical descriptions of different groups of criminals that relate to the discourse on crime. Further, I have noted transitivity, who is described as active and passive in a chain of events, how responsibility for certain developments is distributed, as well as the specific word choices that are used in the description of threat and referent object.\(^8^6\) I have also taken note of the modality used, the degree to which the NPA can be seen to agree with and back the expressed.\(^8^7\) The logic behind this is that with a tendency toward strong objective modality, the persuasive power of the securitizing actor’s words should increase. This has then been added to the analysis of the images of threat and referent object, as these are the ones that are actually constructed through the report. It is the description of threat and referent object – what constitutes a threat, how much of a threat is it, and to whom – that needs to be persuasive. Once it is, it becomes easier to argue that the countermeasures proposed are legitimate and needed. I therefore only conduct analyses of the

\(^{8^3}\) Sjöstedt (2007), p. 239.
\(^{8^4}\) Sjöstedt (2010), pp. 24, 131.
\(^{8^5}\) Balzacq (2011), p. 36.
persuasive power in connection to the construction of the declared threat and the referent object, while the countermeasures are instead used to discuss securitization in general.

The contextual position of the NPA – here understood as its rank within Japanese bureaucracy, its role in decision-making processes, and its influence on Japanese societal discourse, especially through its influence on the Japanese media – is taken into account. However, much of this cannot be inferred from clues in the text, which has meant that I have had to rely on secondary sources that have discussed the role of the NPA in Japanese society rather than an explicit examination.

3.2.2. Limitations and discussion of method
The Copenhagen School branch of securitization theory specifically calls for an analysis of whether and in what way a securitizing move is accepted by the audience. However, following the aim of this paper, the analytical focus is instead on the first step of securitization – the securitizing move. Determining whether and how securitization has been successful, while interesting, is outside the scope of this paper. Thus, while my analysis will be working under the assumption that successful securitizing moves are those that take the audience into account, the acceptance of it is not investigated. The fact that the White Paper examined in this paper is fairly recent would also make the acceptance difficult to ascertain. Instead, I employ the securitizing move “as a measurement for determining if an issue is constructed as a threat to national security.” Through an examination of the security statements of the securitizing move, it is possible to determine whether there is indeed an ongoing securitization in which an issue is constructed as a threat. It is also possible to examine the way in which this construction is carried out. This means that the method is suitable to my aim, but also that it is not possible to confirm any conclusions I come to regarding the persuasiveness of the NPA’s security statements through an examination of audience acceptance.

It must further be noted that it is not wholly unproblematic to discuss persuasive power and discursive strategy simply based on textual analysis of one White Paper. It is all-too-easy to take the results of this analysis – which can really only show how the NPA constructs its threat image – as an indication of the NPA’s intentions. The decoupling of threat image from underlying condition is useful because it allows for discussions on threat framing, but there is also a tendency to see all securitization as negative by default and to see securitizing actors as having malicious intent. While there must be factors and mechanisms that induce decision-makers to securitize an issue – of which one could be that it objectively constitutes a threat to security, but of which another could be an intention to impose harsher laws and increased control – identifying these is beyond this paper’s

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89 Ibid., p. 131.
scope. It is, in any case, near impossible to exactly reconstruct what a writer has intended with a
text, or how an audience might receive it. An investigation into intent or audience acceptance
would require a different type of method. Again, my aim justifies this delimitation. In order to
examine the construction of globalized crime as a threat, the motives of the securitizing actor are
not necessarily relevant. However, this also means that while I can speculate about the possible
consequences of a successful securitization, it is by no means certain that the NPA wishes to bring
these about. It also means that the persuasiveness and discursive strategy that I discern in the report
cannot be understood as a necessarily conscious strategy on the part of the NPA.

The decision to focus on only one White Paper is, I argue, motivated by the fact that my aim is to
study the NPA’s construction of globalized crime in relation to securitization. This particular report,
with its particular special feature, is suitable to this aim. However, the delimitation has
consequences. While I should be able to determine whether the White Paper can be said to
constitute a securitizing move, it is not possible to say whether the NPA has made similar
securitizing moves in the past or whether this report is one part of a larger ongoing securitization
attempt. Finally, the fact that I approach my material having already decided on the theory I am
going to use, a theory which in itself has been accused of being excessively normative, I could end
up with confirmation bias, blinding myself to information that does not confirm my
presuppositions. Further, the choice to do research on another cultural context could lead to
ethnocentric failure to "appreciate the very different interpretations of concepts and processes in
different cultural settings". While it is impossible to entirely erase these assumptions, I have
attempted to counter them by approaching the document with as open a mind as possible, and I
hope that awareness of the problem will lower the risk. Transparency and support of my arguments
with quotations from the text should hopefully make my interpretations as explicit as possible,
allowing readers to make their own decisions about the validity of my analysis. This will also
hopefully enable readers to reconstruct the study, countervailing some of the issues of reliability
and validity.

4. Results and analysis
In this section, the results and analysis of this study will be presented. The disposition of the section
mirrors the three themes of securitization, which for the sake of clarity will be presented separately.
I begin by presenting the images of threat and referent object constructed through the report, with

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90 Bergström & Böréus (2012), pp. 31-32.
91 See e.g. Charrett (2009); Roe (2012).
the way that the image is constructed – contextual position of the securitizing actor, discursive strategy and relative validity – presented under each. I then present the countermeasures that the NPA proposes. This is followed by a discussion about the White Paper as a securitizing move and a subsection in which the threat image of globalized crime that emerges in the report is related to the Japanese context.

4.1. Declared threat
The report describes an alleged recent "qualitative change in offenses" which demonstrate an emerging grave threat to public security "that cannot be fully captured just by statistical figures". However, the NPA writes, “it is apparent that criminal organizations working on a global scale are invading Japan and that those already operating in this country are internationalizing their ranks”. According to the NPA, this situation “can only be described as ‘globalized crime’, in which criminal acts develop on a global scale, posing grave threats to public order.” What exactly do these threats entail? As described in the report, the change in offenses – the globalization of crimes – is characterized by the penetration into Japan of global criminal organizations, the increasingly multinational memberships of these organizations and the global spread of criminal offenses. The NPA notes that crimes committed by "foreign nationals visiting Japan" are already seen as difficult to investigate due to their “characteristic features of extensiveness, systemicity and anonymity”. However, while crime committed by foreign nationals has included cases that have threatened public security in the past as well, recent offenses are “completely different from the mostly sporadic offenses seen in the early years of the Heisei period” The NPA claims that the globalization of crime exacerbates this problem:

"[more] specifically, criminal organizations operating on a global scale disperse their bases of operation all over the world and make the shape of their organizations more opaque and liquid through the division of roles and systematic support within the networks of these bases. This means that the targets of investigations also spread all over the world."

94 NPA (2010), pp. 4-5.
95 Ibid., p. 1.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
98 "Foreign nationals visiting Japan" is the direct translation of the term rainichi gaikokujin, which the NPA uses to distinguish non-permanent resident foreigners from zainichi foreigners, mainly Chinese and Koreans who came to Japan during Japanese colonial rule. Japan’s ius sanguinis nationality principle means that descendants of these, despite being born in Japan, remain foreign nationals with permanent resident status until they go through the naturalization process. See Yamamoto (2004), p. 29.
100 Ibid., p. 5. The Heisei period is the current Japanese era, starting in January 1989 with the succession to the throne by reigning emperor Akihito. The early years of the Heisei period correspond to the early 1990s.
101 Ibid., p. 4.
The NPA notes that criminals used to organize by regional or blood ties. Now, it points out, the
globalization of crime has lead criminals to “band together regardless of nationality” and role
division becomes more insidious as they take “advantage of their respective characteristics in order
to commit offenses more slickly and efficiently”. Foreign nationals’ crime perpetrated in Japan,
the NPA writes, also tends to involve illegal residents and is characterized by a higher degree of co-
offending than crimes committed by Japanese nationals, which it interprets as an indication that
foreign nationals’ crime tend toward increasing organization. In addition, the NPA claims that
“the introduction of abnormal and cruel foreign criminal groups” into Japan leads to changes in the
Japanese “crime business model”. According to the NPA, when global criminal organizations meet
with the traditional criminal organizations, they share their new methods and cause domestic
organizations to change their nature, which “poses a frontal threat to the public safety of Japan”.

To summarize the declared threat: in the report, it is claimed that the globalization of crime leads to
the penetration into Japan of crime and criminal organizations whose operations are carried out on a
global scale, whose membership is multinational and opportunistic and whose structure is
increasingly opaque and fluid. The declared threat is global criminal organizations, “abnormal and
cruel foreign criminal groups”, that are able to take advantage of the opened borders of
globalization.

4.1.1. Construction of image of threat
The report is an attempt at persuasion, and the way the text speaks to the reader underscores this.
Knowledge about globalized crime, and foreign nationals’ crime, is presented as truth through
assertions such as:

“the current state of offenses committed by foreign nationals visiting Japan shows that the
‘globalization of crimes’ has become a serious threat to public security that cannot be fully
captured just by statistical figures”. The words ‘shows’ and ‘has become’ allow for no ambiguity. The report is replete with statements
of equally strong objective modality: it is, for instance, “apparent that criminal organizations /…/
are invading Japan”106, the NPA’s report describes and provides an outlook, and is meant to help
the Japanese “become aware of the serious threat”107 described in it. This modality is not surprising.
The White Papers published by the NPA are produced and consumed as authoritative and reliable

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102 NPA (2010), p. 5.
103 Ibid., p. 8.
104 Ibid., p. 30.
105 Ibid., p. 5.
106 Ibid., p. 1.
107 Ibid., p. 4.
accounts of the previous year’s crime situation. What is surprising is the assertion that the threat of globalized crime is so serious that neither the number of cases cleared nor the number of foreign nationals arrested can do it justice. That the NPA puts this caveat in their White Paper, a statistical account of crimes reported, investigated and cleared for the previous year, seems to contradict the purpose of describing the crime situation to the Japanese public. If the statistics that the NPA itself has prepared cannot be trusted to correctly represent the real crime situation, what can? However, this is not what the NPA seems to wish to convey, rather it seems to suggest that the figures in the statistics, while correct, are too low, that the threat is greater than it can show merely through numbers. Therefore, the Japanese people, to whom this report is addressed, should listen to the NPA’s rhetoric rather than examine numbers. The implication is that the rhetoric, although not entirely supported by statistics, can give a more accurate representation of the reality of globalized crime. Of course, one could also interpret the statement as awareness on the part of the NPA that there is a discrepancy between the image that it is constructing and the crime statistics it publishes. The NPA already possesses a considerable authority when it comes to knowledge about the crime situation, and with wordings such as these in its own White Paper, the agency positions itself as more of an authority on the subject than even its ostensibly objective statistics. This positioning ultimately serves to underscore the magnitude of the threat of globalized crime.

Throughout the report, the NPA differentiates between an in-group ‘us’ and out-group ‘they’. ‘They’ are exploiting the possibilities offered by globalization, ‘they’ are perpetrating crime, invading, sneaking up on Japan and banding together to “commit offenses more slickly and efficiently”.108 ‘They’ are active, criminal, threatening. ‘They’ are the ones who commit globalized crime, and the word seems to refer to criminal organizations in the most explicitly securitizing passages. However, the report’s use of ‘they’ repeatedly conflates criminal organizations with foreign nationals in general and it is not entirely clear from the report exactly who are included in each of these ‘they’. While the declared threat, as described above, is global criminal organizations, the majority of the report concerns crime committed by foreign nationals. The conflation of the more specific ‘they’ with the all-encompassing ‘they’ makes it impossible to distinguish when the NPA is referring to criminal organizations’ crime from when it refers to foreign nationals in general. There is an implicit linking between the globalization of crime, foreign criminal organizations and foreign nationals’ crime in general, without the link being properly explained. This leads to the possible inclusion of all crimes committed by foreign nationals into the threat category of globalized crime and, since it is not possible to say which foreigner will actually commit a crime, implies that every foreign national is a potential source of threat to security.

108 NPA (2010), pp. 4-5.
Through its depiction of the threat of globalized crime, the NPA is implying a number of things about foreigners themselves. By conflating globalized crime and transnational organized crime groups with foreigners’ crime in general, the NPA constructs an image of foreigners as a criminal threat. The NPA claims that specific nationalities tend to commit specific types of crime, linking Chinese to burglaries, Brazilians to car thefts and Iranian to drug trafficking\(^\text{109}\), which further shifts focus from the crime itself, as well as from the perpetrator, to the perpetrator’s foreign nationality. Due to some innate characteristics, the claims seem to imply, Chinese people are drawn to commit burglaries, Brazilians have an affinity for thefts and Iranians tend to smuggle drugs. Differences in criminal propensity, the NPA seems to suggest, can be explained by cultural differences. In the end, this means that suspicion is thrown on all foreign nationals and that foreign nationals’ crime – regardless of the type of crime – is perceived as part of globalized crime.

Through this description of the threat of globalized crime, the NPA is invoking the foreign criminality discourse that is prevalent in Japanese society. The way that the NPA describes foreign nationals’ crime is reminiscent of the foreign criminality discourse’s depiction of foreign nationals as criminal predators feeding on Japan. Similarly, both the NPA’s threat image and the image of foreign nationals’ crime in the discourse highlights foreigners’ innately heightened propensity for crime. They also both claim that foreign nationals’ crimes tend to be more organized than the crimes perpetrated by Japanese nationals.\(^\text{110}\) The statements in the report draw upon but also reinforce images of foreigners as the cause of disorder and spikes in crime rates, as in the assertion that it is the introduction of foreign criminal gangs that has caused disruption of public order in Japan.\(^\text{111}\) The statements used by the NPA in its description will sound familiar to a Japanese reader, and will increase the relative validity and the persuasiveness of the threat image that is constructed.

Furthermore, the NPA’s insistence on associating globalized crime, and foreign nationals’ crime, with transnational organized crime also has consequences. The mention of transnational organized crime, with its connotations to the highly institutionalized security issue of terrorism, serves to transfer insecurity from more traditional security issues to the new issue of globalized crime.\(^\text{112}\) Since there is an implicit linking between the globalization of crime, foreign criminal organizations

\(^{109}\) NPA (2010), pp. 7, 12.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., p. 30.
and foreign nationals’ crime in general, the insecurity is also transferred to foreigners’ crime, and by extension to all foreigners.

4.2. Referent object
The globalization of crime, as conceived of by the NPA, alternately threatens public order, public safety, Japanese society, Japan, human rights and the world. Most frequently, however, it is claimed to threaten the public security of Japan and the stated aim of the special feature is to “help Japanese people become well aware of the serious threat of ‘globalization of crimes’ to public security”. What the globalization of crime seems to be doing is putting the Japanese public at an added risk of victimization. The White Paper exemplifies globalized crime with “jewel robberies by international gangs of robbers, organized car thefts and illegal exports”. However, the NPA then goes on to outline the trends in crimes committed by foreign nationals visiting Japan and in these sections it includes tables of total numbers of cleared offenses, information about forgeries and fraud perpetrated as well as tables which break the statistics down into stimulant drug and handgun smuggling offenses and intellectual property rights violations. This range of crimes brings with it an equally wide range of potential victims whose security is threatened. Following the implications of the report, the globalization of crime could risk the security of persons, of businesses, and of the entire Japanese public, could jeopardize human rights, and it de facto undermines the Japanese justice system by complicating investigations in terms of the identification of perpetrators, collection of evidence and interrogations. “The police”, the report asserts, “will fulfill their duty to protect the lives and property of the people.” The referent object, it seems, is the whole of the Japanese public; indeed, Japan itself. And Japanese people are not only insecure within the borders of Japan; this globalized crime also affects them while overseas, as exemplified with the description of “the abduction of Japanese for ransom by a Nigerian organization in South Africa”.

The NPA also makes a point of the “involvement of illegal residents in crimes that make Japanese people feel less secure”, with burglary offenses as an example and a table which shows the ratio of illegal immigrants among the number of cleared offenses committed by foreign nationals visiting

113 NPA (2010), pp. 1, 4, 5, 21, 29, 30, respectively.
114 Ibid., pp. 4 (3 times), 5 (2 times), 30 (2 times).
115 Ibid., p. 4.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., pp. 7, 11-14.
118 Ibid., p. 21.
119 Ibid., p. 4.
120 Ibid., p. 30.
121 Ibid., p. 4.
It is, then, not only the victims’ actual security that is threatened but also their sense of security; the globalization of crime makes Japanese people feel insecure, which could be conceived of as lowering of their quality of life. As mentioned under the previous section, it is also claimed that even the domestic crime organizations are forced to change due to the influx of globalized crime. This not only points to the ruthlessness and danger of foreign organized crime, but also implies that not even the ones who arguably should have a greater chance of defending themselves can escape victimization.

To summarize the referent object: the threat of globalized crime is declared as threatening Japanese public security. However, corresponding to the image of every foreign national as a potential criminal threat, the report depicts the security of every Japanese, regardless of location, as potentially threatened by the globalization of crime.

4.2.1. Construction of image of referent object
As mentioned earlier, there is a differentiation in the report between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Just as the meaning of ‘they’ is fluid, the meaning of the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘we’ shifts depending on the context in which they are used. However, they never seem to refer to persons who are not Japanese. In the context of suggestions of concrete countermeasures, the ‘we’ is exclusive and refers to the writers of the text. More often, however, as when suggesting who is victimized and who should be worried about globalized crime, it is inclusive and refers to the readers of the report, the Japanese public or even Japan as a whole. This second type of in-group is consistently described as passive: ‘we’ “find ourselves in the situation” of globalized crime, criminal organizations are “operating in this country”, Japan is invaded and penetrated. ‘We’ are not the ones responsible for the current situation; ‘we’ are the ones who need to be protected from its consequences. This is in contrast to the active, criminal ‘they’ described in the sections above. It should be noted that the active ‘they’ is not only contrasted to the passive, victimized, law-abiding Japanese but also to Japanese citizens who do commit crime. ‘They’ enter Japan and reconstruct the Japanese crime business model, causing “domestic criminal organizations to change their nature”. Even the domestic organized crime groups, who are normally described as active perpetrators responsible for crime in Japanese society, are here held to be passive victims of the globalization of crime.

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122 Ibid., p. 8.
124 Ibid., p. 30.
The use of ‘us’ and ‘them’ supports the construction of a foreign criminal threat and a domestic victimized referent object. This not only has consequences for the construction of security threat, and how persuasive an audience might find the threat image, but also for identity construction. Foreigners are constructed as criminal Others who are essentially different from the Japanese Self. This is achieved by emphasizing that ‘we’ are threatened by ‘them’. It is further highlighted by contrasting foreigners’ crime not only to law-abiding Japanese citizens but also to crime committed by Japanese citizens, as in “foreign nationals /…/ have a greater tendency to commit offenses as a group than Japanese nationals, and [their] crimes tend to be increasingly organized.” In addition, the NPA assertion that “one of the reasons why order has been disrupted in Japan is the introduction of abnormal and cruel foreign criminal groups”, as opposed to domestic crime organizations, again reinforces the idea of foreign nationals’ essential difference. The Other is a serious threat not simply because they commit crimes that affect security – as this would then also apply to domestic crime organizations – but because they are non-Japanese, which, as we have seen above, means that they possess a criminal disposition, they are abnormal and cruel, their crimes tend to be committed in groups and to be more organized.

This image of globalized crime, as one of foreign nationals’ crimes perpetrated against Japanese and Japanese society, would strike a chord with a Japanese reader partly because of the foreign criminality discourse mentioned above. However, as described earlier, the foreign criminality discourse is also intimately connected to ideas of Japanese national identity, nihonjinron, which should also serve to make it more relevant to a Japanese reader. In the 1980s, an influx of migrant labor coincided with rises in crime rates. This simultaneously challenged two of Japan’s enduring myths, homogeneity and public safety, leading to a public conflating of the two in the idea of foreign criminality. The challenge to the central tenets of nihonjinron has also meant a challenge to the identity of many Japanese. This makes statements in the NPA’s report that appeal to the discourse of foreign criminality – with its well-defined Other against which the idea of the homogeneous, safe Japanese Self can be reasserted – seem valid and easy to relate to for readers who have grown up in Japan.

4.3. Proposed countermeasures
The NPA stresses that the threat posed by the development of globalized crime needs to be dealt with through enhanced police efforts, for which it asks the Japanese people’s understanding and

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127 Yamamoto (2007).
cooperation.129 The NPA states that changes in the nature of crime occasioned by globalization complicate investigations and necessitate changes in police methods. The NPA asserts that the globalization of crimes is made possible through specific “crime infrastructures” that globalized crime can take advantage of. Crime infrastructures, it goes on to explain, are those that enable the “illegal entry into /…/ and stay in Japan or that make it easy for foreign nationals visiting Japan to commit crimes.”130 These include money laundering through illegal banks and furtherance of illegal employment, but also fraudulent marriages and affiliations.131 There are a number of measures that the NPA is looking to implement in its fight against both globalized crime and the crime infrastructures that enable them. These include the formulation of a “Strategic Plan to Fight the Globalization of Crimes”, strengthened police capabilities to collect, share and analyze information, a focus on joint investigations, expanded domestic cooperation and establishment of a system for international cooperation among police and security agencies.132

The NPA also argues for the promotion of various police activities in communities where foreign nationals reside. In regions with large numbers of foreign nationals the occurrence of “troubling incidents in daily life” is higher than elsewhere, owing in part to differences in language and culture which make communication between foreign nationals and Japanese citizens difficult. In such regions,

“foreign nationals are unable to grow accustomed to Japanese society, and run the risk of being drawn into crimes /…/. There is the possibility that international criminal organizations have infiltrated many such communities and that foreign nationals themselves are causing crime.”133

To tackle this issue, the NPA proposes deepened cooperation with groups and organizations in the community and also describes examples of ongoing initiatives that exist in some Japanese prefectures.134

To summarize the countermeasures: to counter the threat of the globalization of crime, which threatens the public security of Japan, the report proposes a range of countermeasures. One of these is the “Strategic Plan to Fight the Globalization of Crimes” – the by the book “strategy to act” which should accompany a threat declaration. However, there are also countermeasures that do not specifically seem to target the globalization of crime but rather seem to hone in on foreign

130 NPA (2010), p. 11.
131 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
132 Ibid., pp. 16-28.
133 Ibid., p. 19.
134 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
nationals’ potential crimes against Japanese citizens and their disturbance of the Japanese public order. The measures that the NPA proposes to counter these issues include long-term police activities in communities where large numbers of foreign nationals reside, and cannot be said to constitute new and urgent “strategies to act”.

4.4. The White Paper as a securitizing move…
A securitizing move should include the declaration of serious threat to a referent object, accompanied by a strategy to act. The report seems to fit the bill in some respects: the NPA declares the Japanese public seriously threatened by the globalization of crimes – which is used to label foreign nationals’ crime and ultimately foreign nationals – and it presents a strategy to combat this threat. The images of threat and referent object include elements of the earlier ad hoc phase of securitization. The threat is repeatedly mentioned, with emphasis on the changed nature and consequences of foreigners’ crimes. The threat as it is declared is spatially extensive; it poses a threat to the security of every Japanese all over Japan, but also to Japanese worldwide, and ultimately to the world unless the international community imposes strict and uniform legislation.\textsuperscript{135}

The security language used in the report is unequivocal: the word threat is frequently recurring, often accompanied by the modifiers “serious”, “immense” and “great”, which repeatedly underscores the gravity of the situation. The globalization of crime is presented as a threat of considerable magnitude which could risk the security of persons, of businesses, and of the entire Japanese public, could jeopardize human rights\textsuperscript{136}, and which de facto undermines the Japanese justice system by complicating investigations in terms of the identification of perpetrators, collection of evidence and interrogations\textsuperscript{137}. Accordingly, a strategy to act is needed, of which the NPA’s “Strategic Plan to Fight the Globalization of Crimes” is a by-the-book example.

However, it would seem that while the NPA’s language suggests a new, or at least qualitatively changed, threat that urgently needs to be acted upon, some of the countermeasures proposed are already in place. According to the report, an Anti-Global Organized Crime Task Force was created in April 2010, following the February 2010 establishment of an Anti-Global Organized Crime Committee and announcement of a “Strategic Plan to Fight the Globalization of Crimes”.\textsuperscript{138} While these would have been very recently established at the release of the White Paper in July 2010, they could not be established overnight and therefore their existence indicate that the issue of globalized crime must already have been seriously considered at the policy level some time before 2010. This

\textsuperscript{135} NPA (2010), p. 29.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 16.
suggests that by 2010 the securitization was already partly institutionalized, which seems to go against the securitizing language in the construction of threat and referent object.

The partial institutionalization might be at least partly explained by the fact that while the explicitly stated issue of the 2010 White Paper is the globalization of crime – presented as a new threat that needs to be explained in securitizing language – the implicit issue is foreign nationals’ crime, or even foreign nationals. The threat posed by globalization seems to tie into immigration, and the impact of immigration on crime. This is supported by the fact that much of the special feature is not even specifically about globalized crime but rather about the link between foreign nationals and crime. Crime committed by foreign nationals has long been portrayed by the NPA and other governmental authorities, and been perceived by much of Japanese society, as a serious societal problem, and the addition of globalized crime into the mix seems to simply underscore the issue of foreign criminality. Therefore, the groundwork for some of the measures to be implemented as part of this new “Strategic Plan to Fight the Globalization of Crimes” has already been carried out.

4.5. …in the Japanese context
For the Copenhagen School, the NPA’s prominent power position in Japanese society, as described in section 2.3.2., would nearly be reason enough for any securitizing moves it initiates to be accepted by the audience. But, for Balzacq, the contextual power position does not equal success of a securitizing move; the success depends on the securitizing move’s power to persuade, which is affected by the discursive strategy and the relative validity of statements in the move. Judging by results of the examinations of all three of Balzacq’s factors, I would argue that the odds of success for this particular securitizing move – that the audience is persuaded of the NPA’s view of the globalization of crimes – seem good indeed.

The NPA uses a language that is characterized by a strong objective modality: it is making truth claims that it expects readers to accept as reality. The NPA’s power position in government and its prominent role in Japanese society, as an authoritative source of crime statistics to politicians, media and laymen reading its annual reports, lower the probability that its truth claims are challenged. The threat images that emanate from the NPA should therefore have the possibility to form the understanding of the globalization of crime in particular, as well as crime and foreigners in general, relatively uncontested. It is therefore not unlikely that the NPA’s threat images are not only influenced by but, importantly, able to exert influence over dominant societal discourses. In its descriptions of globalized crime, the NPA builds on existing societal discourses on foreign criminality as well as on well-established ideas about a unique Japanese national identity. The fact
that the securitizing move is in line with prevalent ideas and appeals to existing discourses should make the statements in the move seem relatively valid to the audience. Since the NPA, as a securitizing actor, is influenced by societal discourse at the same time as influencing it, the invocation of it is not necessarily a conscious strategy. Nevertheless, the dialogue with the pre-existing ideas of foreign criminality and national identity should affect the probability of the securitizing move’s success.

It would seem that the designation of referent object and threat are closely connected to the conception of Self and Other. The image of globalized crime that emerges in the NPA’s report reasserts a Japanese collective identity informed by nihonjinron by constructing for the Japanese audience a Self – through the victimized, law-abiding referent object – for positive identification as well as an Other – through the essentially different and innately criminal, abnormal and cruel perpetrator of globalized crime – for negative identification. The construction of threat, at the same time that it invokes central tenets of nihonjinron, in a sense seems to be part of the reconstruction of Japanese identity.

5. Concluding discussion

The aim of this paper has been to study the NPA’s presentation of globalized crime in relation to securitization. The NPA’s 2010 White Paper was examined from a perspective of securitization in order to capture the image of globalized crime constructed in the report. This image was then considered in the attempt to determine whether the report could be said to constitute a securitizing move. I have also examined the NPA’s construction of globalized crime from the perspective of its persuasiveness, to see which strategies are used in the construction and how they relate to the specific Japanese context.

The examination of the report showed that it can indeed be interpreted as a securitizing move, but also that it is not simply an issue of an ad hoc securitization of globalized crime. The declared threat, while nominally the globalization of crimes, really seems to be crime committed in Japan by foreign nationals’, and by extension the foreign nationals themselves. Foreign nationals’ crime has long been seen as a societal issue in Japan, which would explain why some of the countermeasures that the report proposes to combat globalized crime have already been implemented. While the securitization of globalized crime is new and the NPA therefore needs to use securitizing language when presenting it, countermeasures against crime by foreign nationals are already at least partially institutionalized. The addition of ‘globalized crime’ and the connection to transnational organized crime seem partly a way to further underline the danger that foreign nationals pose in general.
The examination of the construction of the securitizing move further underlined this. The investigation of the discursive strategy yields a conspicuous division into a Japanese ‘us’ and a foreign ‘them’, with the passive ‘us’ being invaded and attacked by the active ‘them’. This dichotomy is strengthened by an invocation of the prevalent discourse on foreign criminality, in which foreignness is equated with criminal danger. By connecting this discourse to securitizing language which links globalized crime, transnational organized groups and foreign nationals, foreign nationals can become seen not only as a criminal threat but as a threat to national security as well. The NPA’s authoritative voice on crime, amplified by its prominent position in Japanese society, means that its claims about globalized crime as well as foreigners’ crime in general can be accepted without much contest. Since the NPA also invokes existing discourses and identity constructions, the Japanese reader will feel that the statements of the report are familiar, which will affect the relative validity, increasing the possibility of the securitizing move’s acceptance.

However, the NPA does not simply invoke existing discourses on foreign criminality and Japanese national identity. As the authority on crime in Japanese society, its statements could also have the power to reinforce prevalent ideas about crime and foreign nationals, and to reconstruct them to include this newer threat of globalized crime. Similarly, by providing the Japanese reader with a Self to identify with and an Other to use as contradistinction to the Self, the NPA’s construction of threat also serves to both maintain and reconstruct ideas about Japanese identity. Ideas and identities have an impact on interests of individuals, and thereby constrict their actions. The way in which the NPA chooses to construct its statements on the globalization of crime could affect social practices. The association in the report of foreign nationals to criminal organizations could, for instance, affect the Japanese public’s view on foreigners and consequently foster anti-immigration and punitive attitudes. Similarly, the choice to depict threat and referent object in a way that implies that all foreigners are potentially threatening criminal Others while all Japanese are potential victims whose security needs to be protected deepens the dichotomization of nationalized safety and foreignized criminality. This could foster fear and widespread feelings of insecurity, which could in turn be manipulated and used to effect legislative changes toward more control of immigrants and harsher migration policy—all in the name of preventing crimes that threaten security.

Globalization, as established, can be perceived as opportunity as well as threat, and both of these perceptions exist in Japan. Since Japan’s population is expected to drop dramatically over the next couple of decades, the stance that society ultimately adopts on migration flows could decide the economic and demographic future of the nation. The NPA’s language regarding the links between
globalization, foreign nationals and crime has the potential to affect society’s stance on immigration, which seems especially relevant considering the renewed xenophobia that has been flaring up in Japan since the re-election of conservative Abe Shinzo as Prime Minister.139

5.1. Avenues for future research
This paper can hopefully be seen as one step in the problematization of threat construction and securitization in general, and the securitization of transnational crime in Asia and Japan in particular. However, there are several issues that I have not explored that could prove interesting avenues for further research. While I have not examined the relation between any objective underlying condition and the threat image that emerges through the NPA’s White Paper, it is interesting to note the fact that the text so obviously appeals to existing discourses on foreign criminality and Japanese identity constructs. Together with the added caveat of the NPA that its statistics cannot accurately depict the severity of the situation this could nonetheless suggest that there exists a discrepancy between condition and threat framing that would be interesting to pin down. In any case, it seems obvious that a problematization of the construction of transnational (globalized) crime is not uncalled for.

I also found that the language in the 2010 White Paper is securitizing but that the countermeasures outlined include measures that are already in place. I have interpreted this as a sign that there already exists an at least partly institutionalized securitization of foreign Others, in which the ‘globalization of crimes’ is the latest addition. However, it is also possible that the process of securitization takes a different form in Japan, more in line with the dynamics found in research on securitization in Southeast Asia, where securitizing rhetoric is not necessarily followed by extraordinary measures. It would be interesting to follow this lead and to conduct a comparative analysis between Japan and other Asian countries to investigate the similarities and differences, and to thereby try to conclude whether the Copenhagen School framework of securitization is readily applicable to non-Western contexts. In the same vein, it would also be interesting to see the results of a larger comparative study in which the framing of transnational crime is examined in several parts of world.

I have suggested that securitizing moves such as the NPA’s both make use of and promote a fearful social climate, which could ultimately serve to facilitate legislative changes that impose more control on immigrants and on society as a whole. From this study it is not, however, possible to tell

whether the securitizing move is indeed accepted and thus able to effect any legislative change, which could increase the NPA’s authority. Further research could examine earlier declarations and reports by the NPA to see whether it has been able to successfully securitize an issue and whether this has had any consequences for legislation. It could also analyze whether and how the audience has accepted the NPA’s securitizations. On the same note, further research could shed light on the intentions and motives of the NPA for its securitizing language. And finally, the view on globalization and foreign nationals that becomes apparent through my analysis is very bleak, and while the NPA’s position enables it to influence societal discourse, this does not mean that it stands entirely uncontested. The fact that the NPA presents a well-constructed securitizing move that stands a chance at success does not mean that this move alone will decide the course of policy. Future research could contribute to the understanding of policy-making processes and political outcomes by studying counter-discourses and the discursive struggle that shape both the public’s and the nation’s decision-making elites’ perception of globalized crime.
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