



Stockholms
universitet

Kriminologiska institutionen

From Gold Coast to Coke Coast

Politicians, Militaries and Large-Scale Trafficking of
Cocaine in Guinea-Bissau

Examensarbete 1 15 hp

Kriminologi
Examensarbete 1, Avancerad nivå (15 hp)
Vårterminen 2015
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Abstract

The tiny West African nation of Guinea-Bissau made the news as the first narco-state in Africa during the mid-2000s. Guinea-Bissau had out-of-the-blue become a key transit point for cocaine out of South America on route to Europe. What's more, high-ranking government and military officials were supposedly deeply complicit in the illicit drug trafficking. This master's thesis applies the state crime theory of Penny Green and Tony Ward in order to explain the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. No previous criminological studies have ever revealed the reasons for these dynamics. In this thesis, I illustrate how weak institutions, corruption, unsustainable economy, porous borders, and a lack of military legitimacy have conspired to facilitate the development of the predatory state in this country. State power has become fundamental to individual gain, as state elements fused with crime. Consequently, I demonstrate that the large-scale trade of cocaine has greatly contributed to the rise of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state.

Keywords: State Crime, Predatory State, Narco-State, Global Security, Drug Trafficking, Cocaine, West Africa, Penny Green, Tony Ward

Abstract på svenska

Den västafrikanska lilleputtnationen Guinea-Bissau skapade rubriker som Afrikas första ”narkostat” i början av 2000-talet. Guinea-Bissau hade plötsligt blivit ett viktigt transitland under kokainets resa från Sydamerika till Europa. Inte nog med det, enligt initierade källor var högt uppsatta statstjänstemän och militärer ordentligt insyltade i den illegala droghandeln. Detta examensarbete tillämpar Penny Green och Tony Wards teori om statsbrott för att förklara varför Guinea-Bissau blivit en *predatory state* (”rovdjursstat”). Aldrig tidigare har en kriminologisk studie belyst orsakerna till denna utveckling. Min uppsats åskådliggör hur förekomsten av svaga institutioner, korruption, instabil ekonomi, bristande militär legitimitet, samt avsaknad av gränskontroll har samverkat till framväxten av *the predatory state* i landet. Statliga maktpositioner har blivit synonyma med egen vinning, medan staten smält samman med brottsligheten. Min slutsats blir vidare att den storskaliga handeln med kokain i hög grad har bidragit till uppkomsten av *the predatory state* i Guinea-Bissau .

Nyckelord: Statsbrott, Predatory State, Narkostat, Global Säkerhet, Narkotikasmuggling, Kokain, Västafrika, Penny Green, Tony Ward

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards my supervisor, Dr. Nubia Evertsson at the Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, for her continuous support, constructive criticism and endless patience throughout every stage of this master's thesis. Without her insight and encouragement, this thesis would not have been possible.

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1. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

1.1 Introduction

Following an alarming United Nations (UN) report in 2007, *Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa*, Guinea-Bissau made headlines as Africa's first narco-state (Bybee 2011:4 note 10; Ellis 2009:171). That is to say, in the report the Guinea-Bissauan state itself was revealed as an active participant and enabler of a large-scale transnational drug smuggling operation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 2007a:29). The tiny West-African nation of Guinea-Bissau had suddenly become a key transit state for South American drug trafficking on the way to Europe (Vulliamy 2008). West Africa is conveniently situated half way to Europe by ship or plane (Van Riper 2014:4-5). As much as one third of all cocaine reaching Europe is thought to pass through West Africa, with emphasis on Guinea-Bissau (Falkehed 2011). The traditional cocaine route out of South America went straight to Europe, sometimes via the Caribbean (UNODC 2007a:5). Guinea-Bissau is a conflict-ridden weak or failed state, where the lack of authoritative governmental control throughout the territory has left the door open for illegal activity (Vulliamy 2008; Madeira et al. 2011:1, 6). The military and other high-ranking officials of the state are taking an active part in the drug trafficking (The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2015). As stated by the UNODC (2008a:4) in a report on West African drug trade: “[t]he former Gold Coast is turning into the Coke Coast”.

This study aims to explain the main root causes of the recent emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state (this concept will be defined in chapter 2). In order to do so, state crime theory will be applied. In their theory, Green and Ward (2004) highlight organizational crime, where an organization—such as a state—commits the crime rather than single individuals. Still, the allure of personal gain is accounted for. When nothing but self-enrichment matters for the ruling elite at the expense of the population, the state is turning predatory.

1.2 Research problem and aim

Few studies have put the spotlight on the subject of state crime, a budding research field which has been somewhat overlooked by mainstream criminology (Michalowski et al. 2010:1-2). According to Chambliss et al. (2010:xiii), this is strong incentive for further

research in order to expose and combat state crime. Most state crime literature focuses solely on transgressions of advanced democratic countries (Green & Ward 2004:10). To my knowledge, no previous criminological studies have set out to explain the recent emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. To fill this breach in science, this master's thesis is bringing in the state crime theory of Green and Ward (2004). Their theory will be applied as a means to interpret the empirical material, consisting essentially of research literature.

Furthermore, Bybee (2011:22) argues that there is a shortage of studies on illicit drug trade in West Africa including Guinea-Bissau, whereas: “[c]opious amounts of research have been performed on drug trafficking in Latin America, the Caribbean, and more recently in Afghanistan and Central Asia”. She ascribes this fact to the recent surfacing of the West African drug trafficking routes. What's more, I find that the studies on state-organized narco-trafficking in Guinea-Bissau that do exist, normally discuss the situation against a backdrop of the concept of weak or failed states (to be defined in chapter 2). As Erdal (2012:2) points out, failed states have become scapegoats for everything from organized crime to drug trafficking. A criminological study that aims to shed light on the causes of the transformation of Guinea-Bissau into a predatory state is much called for.

1.3 Research questions

This thesis sets out to explain the following questions:

- Could the state apparatus in Guinea-Bissau be considered a predatory state (along the lines of the theory of Green and Ward)?
- If that is indeed the case, what dynamics have primarily contributed to this situation?

1.4 Disposition

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of state crime as well as an overview of various theoretical standpoints within the research field. The chapter details the state crime theory of Green and Ward (2004), which plays a pivotal part in explicating the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. Chapter 3 outlines the existing empirical research. Chapter 4 depicts the data gathering, pre-understanding, research

method, limitations, and ethical considerations. Chapter 5 contains the results. Chapter 6 comprises of the analysis and discussion. Chapter 7 holds the conclusion of the thesis.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents and discusses the theories of state crime. For starters, the concept of state crime will be introduced and explained. From there, three different approaches within the state crime research will be distinguished and thoroughly presented. There will also be a discussion as to why the theory of Green and Ward (2004) has been chosen for this study to help explaining the current Guinea-Bissauan situation. Then the state crime theory of Green and Ward (2004) will be comprehensively depicted and defined, including the concept of the predatory state. Finally, other key terms of this thesis, the narco-state and the weak or failed state, will be accounted for.

2.1 State crime—a contradiction in terms

In criminology, the state normally defines what constitutes a crime or not (Michalowski et al. 2010:1). However, sometimes the criminal act or wrongdoing is committed by the state itself, they allege. State crime may be driven by individual motivations or organizational goals; an overlap is not uncommon (Michalowski 2010:13). For obvious reasons, state crimes run the risk of going unnoticed and/or unpunished, since the state defines and decides what makes a crime (Chambliss et al. 2010:xiii). From this perspective, the state is criminal no more than when it admits to breaking the law (Green & Ward 2004:1). Yet, the making and enforcing of laws, is a process heavily influenced by markers of class, money and power (Michalowski 2010:14). Hence, as explained by Chambliss et al. (2010:xiii), as of recently, the criminological concept of state crime embodies not only criminal acts in accordance with legislation, but a broader take where social harms are considered too.

State crime could consist of a number of abuses of power that violate social, economic and cultural rights (Bassiouni 2011a:2-3). He explains that some examples of state crimes are: piracy, slavery, genocide, war crimes, torture, human rights violations, weapons trafficking, environmental crimes, corruption, and the plundering of the state's public treasury, et cetera.

According to Green and Ward (2004:1), outside the industrialized world, the second most common crime of all is a state crime—that of asking for a bribe.

State crime is nothing new under the sun; it has occurred throughout the history of mankind. Typically, state crime arises when an unjust ruler or power-abusing ruling elite take hold of the state. Out of these two, tyrannical leaders tend to create the worst damage since they exert the strongest control of the population (Bassiouni 2011a:2-4). In addition to state actors, nonstate actors may carry out a similar pattern of conduct. Such violent group dynamics are virtually impossible to control by the state. These actors may be even more flexible than states; switching between the role of combatants and that of organized crime during internal conflicts. In some cases, their organization has gained control over a territory and its populace. Thus, these nonstate actors have assumed the role of a state and should be held accountable for state crime as well. Private contractors, hired by states to engage in violent domestic conflicts, represent another potential state crime faction (Bassiouni 2011a:2-4).

2.2 State crime theories—three approaches

Within the new and emerging research field of state crime, a troika of major theoretical standpoints is distinguishable (Michalowski 2010:16-17). These are the *juridical*, *deviance* (conduct norm) and *social injury/harm* approaches, he enlightens.

The *juridical* approach is advocated by state crime scholars such as William J. Chambliss, David Kauzlarich and Ronald C. Kramer. As explained by Westervelt and Cook (2010:183), this legalistic perspective on state crime has been defined in the following manner by Chambliss: “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state”. While Rothe and Mullins give the subsequent definition: “any action that violates international public law, and/or a states’ own domestic law when these actions are committed by individual actors acting on behalf of, or in the name of the state even when such acts are motivated by their personal economical, political and ideological interests” (Bassiouni 2011b:29). In other words, this framework stipulates that state crime must violate the law, as explained by Michalowski (2010:16-17). This serves to legitimize the topical definition of state crime (Bassiouni 2011b:29). Hence, Michalowski (2010:16-17) declares that high-profile cases of state crime are typical within this approach,

when national or supra-national bodies are compelled to intervene. The drawbacks of this perspective are obvious: states are not likely to criminalize or take legal action against the very wrongdoings that simultaneously further their own interests. Also, any supra-national initiatives tend to focus their efforts on present or former leaders of weak and failed states, he argues.

The *deviance (conduct norm)* approach is somewhat less narrow than the juridical approach in terms of definition and scope, as expressed by Michalowski (2010:17-21). It is sometimes referred to as the social response approach (Bassiouni 2011b:26). It is most notably advocated by David O. Friedrich, Penny Green and Tony Ward, as maintained by Michalowski (2010:17-21). This perspective directs its attention towards organizational deviance, where concerned audiences are willing to act against deviant acts of harm which are in direct violation of established conduct norms; albeit not criminal. A forte of this approach is the possibility to analyze complex organizations, where singular individuals are not to blame. A clear disadvantage is the dubious action of attaching the label *crime* to an act that has not actually been criminalized. Conversely, the term deviance is not likely to create the same public outcry as the labeling of the state wrongdoing as an actual crime. In terms of research, information concerning deviance within state institutions may also be hard to gain, Michalowski (2010:17-21) affirms.

The *social injury/harms* approach has the broadest scope by far, and it is advocated by Raymond Michalowski and Simon Pemberton (Michalowski, 2010:17-21). As argued by Westervelt & Cook (2010:184), the social injury model has been defined in the following manner by Kauzlarich et al.: “illegal, socially injurious, or unjust acts which are committed for the benefit of a state or its agencies, and not for the personal gain of some individual agent of the state”. Michalowski makes yet another definition of social injury: “legally permissible acts or sets of conditions whose consequences are similar to those of illegal acts” (Bassiouni 2011b:26).

Thus, this perspective is preoccupied with structural and organizational harms caused by state practices, which have been rendered normal in pursuit of security or in a state of exception (martial law) (Michalowski 2010:17-21). Albeit non-criminalized, these consequences are as severe as acts defined as crimes, he states. A weakness is the *width* of the model, where almost all individual and institutional activity could be considered to be covered; and

furthermore—who should have the right to determine what constitutes a *harm* (Bassiouni 2011b:26-28)?

In theory, it may appear that all three approaches to state crime could be used to explain the empirical case. However, when assessing the different state crime approaches, it becomes apparent that the deviance approach by Penny Green and Tony Ward (2004) is the most appropriate choice for this study of Guinea-Bissau. Not only does this theory consider *political* factors relevant to Third World states (such as weak institutions); it also focuses on both *organizational* and *personal* aspects (for instance in terms of enrichment and corruption), and looks at *conduct norm violations* that are not criminalized. The juridical approach, as advocated by for instance William J. Chambliss, does indeed cover organizational aspects but misses out on the aspect of personal gain. In terms of political factors, it focuses on crimes committed by strong Western states which lack the weak institutions of developing nations. Besides, it only addresses state crime so defined by the law. The social harms approach, as preferred by for instance Raymond J. Michalowski, does encompass social harms aspects not criminalized by the law, but misses out on the political factors and personal gain. Hence, the juridical and social harms approaches are less suitable than the deviance approach.

2.3 Penny Green and Tony Ward's theory of state crime

In their theory, Green and Ward (2004:1-2) regard the concept of state crime from a sociological standpoint. They argue that in international society, certain norms of conduct must be met by states. When these norms are violated, public outcry ensues with implications such as pressure of domestic and international opinion, embargos and economic sanctions. These reactions may be slight, but they occur when states display deviant behaviour that violates legal norms. Sometimes these norms are tied to justices such as universal human rights, which are pillars of criminology that simply cannot be ignored. Hence, Green and Ward's (2004:1-2) definition of state crime reads: "state organisational deviance involving the violation of human rights". The elements of this definition—state, organization, deviance and human rights—will be defined and outlined in this subchapter.

According to Green and Ward (2004:2-3), the common denominator of all states should be understood as the legitimate monopoly of the usage of force. Hence, the state exercises organized and equipped force, the control of territories, various institutions of coercion such as prisons, and fiscal agencies. Sometimes vast areas are controlled by rebel forces or similar which exert informal or formal taxes from the population, but are yet to be recognized as sovereign states. These entities are referred to as ‘proto-states’ (Green & Ward 2004:2-3).

Legitimacy is another important concept of state, in accordance with Green and Ward (2004:3). A state can only be viewed as legitimate to the extent:

- It acts in accordance with the rules that it sets for itself and its citizenry, and
- Those rules seem to be justified by shared beliefs (Green & Ward 2004:3).

In between the capitalist state and its citizens, civil society exists (Green & Ward 2004:3-4). Civil society consists of a range of organizations, as for instance pressure groups, mass media, religious bodies, academic institutions, and voluntary associations. Hegemony seeps through society, and it seems reasonable to the population that force may be used to uphold law and order. Hence, the interests of the ruling elite will be perceived as beneficial for the lower classes. The civil society plays an important role in influencing public opinion and policies, due to its legitimizing and consolidating ability. Yet contrarily, civil society can be used to denounce deviant behaviour of the state (Green & Ward 2004:3-4). Consequently, Green and Ward (2004:4) define deviance in the following manner—basically “[a] matrix of an actor, a rule, an audience and a potentially significant sanction”:

An act is deviant when there is a social audience that

- Accepts a certain rule as a standard of behavior
- Interprets the act (or similar acts of which it is aware) as violating the rule, and
- Is disposed to apply significant sanctions – that is significant from the point of view of the actor – to such violations (Green & Ward 2004:4).

As explained by Green and Ward (2004:4-5), *the actor* is state agencies and *the audience* is the domestic or international civil society and/or other states, international organizations, and domestic state agencies. *The rule* is international and domestic law and social conduct norms as perceived by the audience. *The sanction* could be legal punishments, insurgencies on the initiative of the population, devastating blows to the nation’s reputation domestically or

internationally, as well as sanctions in terms of economy, diplomacy, or military interventions from other states (Green & Ward 2004:4-5).

Committed by state agencies, state crime is a type of organizational deviance (Green & Ward 2004:5-6). In other words, the organization, rather than the individual actors, performs the illegal or deviant act. The characteristics of the organization may persist over time, even when its members come and go. Just as individuals, organizations make and implements decisions, pursue goals, and have to relate to rules and regulations. This makes organizations susceptible to shaming and sanctions. However, this is not to say that the entire state (organization) shares the same goal. Institutions may well be at odds with each other. In a similar fashion, different factions may be present within state agencies, making it possible for agencies to display deviant behaviour either in its entirety or partially in the form of sub-units. There are also instances when the entire state may act as one and the same entity. A specific trait of organizational deviance within state crime is that abnormal behaviour is carried out in order to meet the operative goals of the organization. Individual deviance, however, is performed for personal benefit. Yet an overlap is not uncommon (Green & Ward 2004:5-6).

In terms of the definition of human rights, Green and Ward (2004:7-8) argue that in the modern age, human beings have a valid claim on society of basic rights (shelter, food, clothing and liberation from physical restraints and debilitating pain) and more refined rights (education, opportunity to participate in cultural activities and the political process). Nevertheless, the concept of human rights must not be confused with social harm, which is a much more loosely knit formulation that transgresses the borders of criminology. Hence, not every denial of freedom and well-being should be regarded as criminal, according to Green and Ward (2004:7-8). The human rights dimension has in part been added to their state crime definition to exclude situations where a state (or state agency) declines to comply with repressive orders.

Green and Ward (2004:11-18) maintain that corruption is a clandestine state crime. It may involve bribery, embezzlement or more fluidly any illicit transaction by state officials resulting in an inappropriate reward. *Corruption as a means* could include state initiated illegal activities such as drug trafficking as a means to cover operational costs for the armed forces and the police—or financing conflict. Contrarily, in *tolerated corruption* the corrupt officials are not driven by organizational goals, but their behaviour is tolerated by others who

are. *Corruption as an organisational goal* is solely focused on the pursuit of profit. Then state agencies or states seek to maximize the gains of the small ruling elite by means of corruption. Such rent-seeking, occurring when executive, legislative or judicial powers and law enforcement agencies are used for profit, may become institutionalized as the goal of the organization. When state structure elements are fused with private firms as far as corruption goes, it is sometimes referred to as *total state capture*. In these cases, which may involve illicit trafficking, the private operator and the state are both willing participants in the same scheme. Then the whole state is infested with profit-making (Green & Ward 2004:11-18). Rent-seeking is often encouraged within weak states lacking coercive, economic and political power (Green & Ward 2004:87-93). Hence, in the deeply segregated Third World societies, politics has turned into a ferocious zero-sum game where the winner takes it all and the losers are eliminated (Green & Ward 2004:24).

2.4 The predatory state according to Green and Ward

Green and Ward (2004:185-190) assert that states come in three forms: *capitalist states* (either industrialized or transitional), *state capitalist-states* (where the state owns the means of production) and *predatory states*. The latter type is run by state elites seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the population, while governmental responsibilities and public interest are neglected. In these states, the entire territory of the nation is usually not controlled; contrarily, vast areas may be controlled by a non-state actor. The economies of the predatory states are typically dependant on foreign aid, natural resources and illegal trade. The criminogenic characteristics of these nations can largely be blamed upon colonialism. There was never any incitement for domestic legitimacy as a basis for military power, since the military and policing structures had been obtained from the colonial power (Green & Ward 2004:185-190). Consequently, when a predatory state reaches its most extreme form of the *captured state*, the very state itself can be organized strictly for profit-making ventures and political power is vital to individual gain (Green & Ward 2004:87-93, 104). In the captured state, it is no longer possible to distinguish between organized criminals and state officials, according to Green and Ward (2004:87-93). While state building relies on organized crime such as illicit drug trade, the captured states may provide a haven for drug and arms traffickers or mercenaries (Green & Ward 2004:87-93). All told, Green and Ward (2004) do

not make a definition or formulate any bullet list delineating the criteria of the predatory state; they basically make a more general description.

2.5 Defining the narco-state and the weak or failed state

In accordance with Bybee (2011:85-87), there is no official definition of the term ‘narco-state’. Yet some prior attempts to define a ‘narco-state’ have been made. For starters, Paoli et al. (2009:142-143) recap what they consider the traditional ‘narco-state’ definition: “First, a narco-state is a country that is economically dependent on the illicit drug economy; second, a narco-state is a country in which the government elites are complicit in the illicit drug trade.”

Furthermore, as retold by Bybee (2011:90-91), the former US ambassador to Peru, David Jordan, formulated the following definition of a ‘narco-state’ in 1999: “States where the criminalization of the political system has reached the point that the highest officials of the government protect and depend on narcotics trafficking organizations”. In accordance with the findings of David Jordan, the very process of *narcostatization* has an effect on democracies and authoritarian states both:

The corruption of the political regime as a result of narcotics trafficking; the criminalization of the state. Narcostatization undermines the democratic check on the abuses of power by insulating elected officials from accountability and transforms the authoritarian state into a criminal one (Bybee 2011:91).

I lean towards yet another, slightly more elaborate, definition. I perceive a narco-state as a nation, either a transit or producer country, where a large share of the state income base stems directly from illicit drug trade partially or entirely under the control and/or protection of the state itself (high-ranking governmental officials, the military, the judiciaries, and/or the police, et cetera). For this definition, it is beside the point if the state could be considered to control organized crime, or if organized crime has seized control of the state. This definition is limited in the sense that it does not suit the consumer country.

Another term to be clarified is the ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state. There are four types of states in the world of today, according to Rotberg (2013): strong, weak, failed, and collapsed. The *strong states* compose of Western and/or industrialized nation states. *Weak states*, found all over the world including nearly all of sub-Saharan Africa, are considered so since they cannot provide

vital political goods (public services) in adequate quantities or qualities. *Failed states* are characterized by internal wars and a subsequent failure to exercise a monopoly of violence. They fail to deliver sufficient public services (for instance educational and health services) to the majority of the people. They're corrupt, unsafe and discriminative, denies participatory rights, and favours ruling elites in terms of economic opportunity. *Collapsed states* are short of government and governance, harbour many conflicts and lack security (Rotberg 2013).

The narco-state and the weak or failed state are terms related to the field of political science. According to my understanding, within political science the sovereign state is not considered criminal, it may however be infiltrated and taken over by criminal elements. In criminology, state crime theory suggests that the very state itself may indeed be viewed as criminal. In other respects, the narco-state and the predatory state are rather similar concepts. The predatory state, however, comprises of several more components. The weak or failed state is not necessarily concerned with illicit trade, drug-trafficking or the fusion of state and crime. However, the definitions of the narco-state and the weak or failed state tend to vary by author. Still, all these theoretical concepts could be used to explain the Guinea-Bissauan situation; in fact, narco-state theory and failed state theory have already been examined by Bybee (2011). This study focuses on the predatory state; the only criminological concept out of the three.

3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

There is seemingly no previous research on Green and Ward's (2004) predatory state concept; neither could previous research on the narco-state or drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau be presented within this chapter, since they make the empirical research literature of this study. Hence, this chapter briefly introduces previous studies on state crime.

3.1 Previous research

State crime is an up-and-coming research area in criminology. As such, it is still relatively sparsely researched. The principal research in the field so far has been compiled by Chambliss and Moloney (2015) as well as Friedrichs (1998). Within the deviance approach to state crime, the existing studies focus mainly on various forms of state deviance and the linkages

between state agencies and criminal organizations. Moreover, research studies adopting the deviance approach examine institutional problems related to the violations of national and international laws and regulations. For instance, Evertsson (2015) examines how legal electoral donations in Colombia still facilitate corruption, when the donor is compensated by various undue benefits. Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) investigate if harms imposed by the policies of the World Bank during globalization could be deemed criminal, in respect to a case of a hydropower dam project in Thailand. Green (2005) reveals the relationship between the state, corruption, corporations and organized crime in terms of responsibility for disaster, against a backdrop of three different earthquakes in Turkey. Green et al. (2007) shed light on the blurred line between illegal and legal (albeit deviant) logging, with a closer look at the timber industry in Tasmania.

Previous studies on African state crime tend to emphasize human right violations. The most significant studies are as follows. Mullins and Rothe (2007) explore the mechanisms behind the Darfuri genocide, where Sudanese military and state-sponsored militias are responsible for the death of 400,000 civilians. Rothe et al. (2008) look at the conditions fostering the Rwandan genocide, paying particular attention to World Bank and IMF policies. Hoofnagle (2011) studies the Burundi cycle of violence where hundreds of thousands of civilians have fallen victim to crimes against humanity committed by the state. Lenning and Brightman (2009) highlight the wide-spread state-sanctioned sexually abuse of women by military forces in Nigeria and reveal the reasons behind the apparent impunity of the culprits. Other studies on African state crime address the issue of political exiles in the United Kingdom being victimized by the state in their native South Africa (Israel, 1998), and the linkages between the risky lifestyles being imposed on sub-Saharan women by neoliberal economics in the globalized era and the subsequent poverty and spreading of HIV (Ezeonu & Koku, 2008).

Despite the above mentioned studies on the deviance approach and African state crime, there is seemingly no prior research within these fields linking state officials with drug dealers in Guinea-Bissau or elsewhere. However, these topics have been explored within *other* academic areas. Yet, as it appears, the criminological concept of the predatory state has not been tested empirically before. Therefore, the present study attempts to advance the understanding of state crime in Guinea-Bissau.

4. METHOD

This chapter delineates the qualitative research method of thematic textual analysis, data collection, pre-understanding, methodological issues and ethical considerations. The textual analysis of this thesis is built on qualitative research and draws upon secondary sources.

4.1 Method

For conducting the study, the qualitative research method of textual analysis is applied. As explained by Bryman (2012:289, 557-558), this method involves searching for underlying themes within the analyzed research material. The process of extracting these themes is usually not outlined in detail. Each distinctive theme may then be accompanied by an explicatory definition. The selected themes are normally illustrated, for instance with brief quotations or similar from newspapers or magazines (providing that is the material being analyzed), according to Bryman (2012:557-558). Textual analysis is appropriate for a number of textual materials, not merely media related items (Bryman 2012:304-305). It is a suitable method for gaining information on contexts that are otherwise difficult to access (Bryman 2012:304-305). Transparency is secured due to the assignment of the research material into categories, which will minimize the influence of subjectivity on behalf of the researcher (Bryman 2012:289). Overall, textual analysis is a systematic and objective technique for making inferences (Bryman 2012:289).

For the analysis, I consequently utilized the criteria of the predatory state (including its most extreme form of the captured state, which has been denoted), as outlined in the description by Green and Ward (2004:87-93, 104, 185-190). Within Green and Ward's (2004) depiction of the predatory state, several main principles could be discerned. In the next step, along the lines of Bryman (2012:557-558), these criteria were coded into themes in the following manner (themes are stated in italics, definitions in brackets):

- *Enriching at the expense of the people* (the state is run by state elites seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the population, all the while governmental responsibilities and public interest are neglected)

- *Lacking military legitimacy* (there was never any incitement for domestic legitimacy as a basis for military power, since the military and policing structures had been obtained from the colonial power)
- *Lacking territorial control* (the entire territory of the nation is usually not controlled)
- *Unsustaining economy* (the economy is typically dependant on foreign aid, natural resources and illegal trade)
- *Fusing state structures with crime* (a captured state—the state is organized strictly for profit-making ventures, political power is vital to individual gain, it is no longer possible to distinguish between state officials and organized criminals, state building relies on organized crime such as illicit drug trade, and the state may provide a safe haven for criminals)

These criteria make the themes of the textual analysis. Some themes might overlap somewhat. This is a result of certain similarities between the various components of the predatory state concept. The last theme, *fusing state structures with crime*, contains far more components than the other themes. Yet it made sense to merge all the closely related criteria regarding the captured state into one theme. A shortcoming of the theory of Green and Ward (2004) is that it does not stipulate how many requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for the predatory state to be confirmed. Hence, in my study I will merely establish which of the abovementioned themes that are present in the Guinea-Bissauan context, when examined against the empirical material. Corresponding to Bryman's (2012:557) suggestions, I will use quotations and encapsulations. This strategy will provide enhanced coherence and thus improve the understanding of the rather complex chain of events in Guinea-Bissau. To the extent that the criteria of the predatory state are to be found in the empirics, I will also employ interpretation to deduce dynamics behind the situation, as proposed by Bryman (2012:297-298).

4.2 Data collection

The data gathering for this study—that is, secondary sources in databases and search engines—has been employed by the research method of crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing normally involves online activity and although there is no fixed definition, it has been described as: “an organizing research entity that outsources research tasks, which that entity

could not achieve alone, to large groups of self-selected people (lay and expert)” (Williams 2013:30-32). Crowdsourcing appeals to people’s innate sense of right and wrong and is apt for state crime research, where the researcher may have to circumvent a state apparatus intent on covering up criminal activity (Williams 2013:30-32, 45). For this thematic textual analysis, I accessed the databases and search engines of Google Scholar, Libris, and EBSCO for data collection. The searching criteria consisted of various combinations of the terms: ‘Guinea-Bissau’, ‘narco-state’, ‘predatory state’, ‘kokain’, ‘cocaine’, ‘cocaine trade’, ‘cocaine trafficking’, ‘drug trade’ and ‘drug trafficking’. Given the search design, predominantly literature in English could be considered.

In terms of selection, I focused on scientific material with a strong emphasis on the Guinea-Bissauan situation under investigation in this thesis. However, down to a dearth of academic research corresponding to the topic of the study, several reports from organizations as well as newspapers and magazines were selected as supplementary sources. In the latter cases, the selection was based on extensive reporting and relevance for the topical study as well. The empirical sources among the research literature are as follows: academic publications/peer reviewed articles (Bybee 2009, 2011, 2012; Ellis 2009; Gibert 2009; Goudsmid et al. 2011; Van Riper 2014), official documents from organizations (Madeira et al. 2011; The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2015; UNODC 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2013) and reports from newspapers/magazines (Falkehed 2011; Hanson 2007; Mungai 2015; Pallister 2009; Poolgreen and Cowell 2009; Vernaschi 2010; Vulliamy 2008). As far as all sources go, in-depth coverage of the time period 2005-2009 when the booming cocaine trade took off was preferred. As suggested by Bryman (2012:293), the occurrence of a phenomenon could well determine the time period studied, even though in research areas of on-going crime the time period could be less narrowly defined. Moreover, Bryman (2012:623) also accounts for the advantages of selecting thorough material as opposed to more limited write-ups.

4.3 Pre-understanding

I have no present or prior affiliation with Guinea-Bissau. However, I have taken courses in political science, which is where I first encountered the phenomenon of the narco-state of Guinea-Bissau. Hence, I have presupposed that the nation is in fact a narco-state, in accordance with a multitude of sources. More so, in my mind I cannot help but making

parallels or comparisons to various other concepts within the realm of political science, such as for instance the weak or failed state (explained in chapter 2), the rentier state (where a massive influx of state-controlled oil rents finance the state apparatus) or the ghost state (lacking virtually all institutional capacity including territorial control). In particular, I find the theory of the rentier state suitable to compare with the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where income from the cocaine trade could equal oil rents. Yet in this criminological degree project, the predatory state in Guinea-Bissau is under examination. By judging from my pre-comprehension of the situation in Guinea-Bissau, and the criteria of the predatory state as depicted by Green and Ward (2004), it was also my understanding from the onset of the study that at least some of the components of the predatory state would match the empirics on Guinea-Bissau. However, in beforehand I had no way of telling how well.

4.4 Methodological issues

A limitation of the method is that secondary sources, as opposed to primary sources, have to be accessed for information regarding the themes of the predatory state. Hence, the results are dependent on the contents of the research material (Bryman 2012:306). The existing empirical literature shows two strong tendencies: it either deals with the problem of drug trafficking in Africa and Guinea-Bissau, or with the emergence of the narco-state and institutional factors. However, none of this research literature is criminological. Certain limitations of study were also required. Due to the magnitude of the problem, the focus is on illicit cocaine trade as an indicator of the materialization of the predatory state. Other types of alleged transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau are human trafficking (not conducted by the state), additional drug trade (occurring in West Africa as a region), small arms trafficking (largely abandoned in the mid-2000s), and links to terrorism (Falkehed 2011; Vernaschi 2009; Madeira et al. 2011:9; Ellis 2009:172-173). Hence, these supposed crimes were excluded from in-depth study. The onset of large-scale cocaine trafficking is a relatively recent phenomenon in Guinea-Bissau, for that reason the main time period of study has been narrowed down to approximately the years of 2005-2009.

Reliability has to do with the level of trustworthiness of the sources utilized in the study; ideally, the data should be constant enough to generate the same results if the study was to be repeated (Robson 2002:93). As cautioned by Williams (2003:45-46), a potential pitfall of

crowdsourcing could be information that is not fact-checked. In accordance with Bryman (2012:553), it is pivotal that the author has profound knowledge of the topic in the research literature. The credibility of the document is vital (Bryman 2012:306). Also, documents must not be viewed as objective (Bryman 2012:551). However, the main sources used for this essay are scientific and peer-reviewed. Hence, reliability should be sufficient, even though sources from media and organizations are also utilized.

Validity is related to if the sources (books, articles, et cetera) utilized in the study describe what they are supposed to, thus allowing for viable conclusions (Robson 2002:93). A downside of the method could be that some aspects—such as, in this case, poverty and lack of infrastructure—are constant, making it harder to demonstrate causality to the phenomenon studied. Another cause for concern is that textual analysis as a method is too centered on the chosen themes to take notice of other potentially significant chains of events. In my study, this primarily means the omission of several historical and societal conditions pertinent to the narcostatization in Guinea-Bissau. One more weakness is the focus on the content of the text, as opposed to the actors *behind* the course of events. It is also hard to get at *why* something happened, in accordance with Bryman (2012:307). Latent subjectivity on behalf of the researcher, when interpreting the research literature during the textual analysis, is another potential weak spot (Bryman 2012:39-40, 306-307). Further shortcomings could arise if the material is not authentic (Bryman 2012:306). Yet, data (source) triangulation is applied in this study, where the junction of sources promotes validity, as proposed by Denzin (1970:310).

Representativeness begs the question if the examined materials are representative of all materials in the field (Bryman 2012:306). Yet findings built on qualitative research are not likely to be generalizable to other settings (Bryman 2012:406); the same goes for this study. (Due to language barriers, I lack access to sources in Portuguese, which is the official language of Guinea-Bissau. A shortage of local sources could be regarded as problematic in social science, in terms of the consequent outwards perspective. However, down to the nature of this study (state crime and narco-trafficking), a multitude of domestic sources was not to be expected in the first place.

4.5 Ethical considerations

The contents of this essay could pose certain ethical implications on the individual as well as the structural level. On the individual scale, in this thesis several high rank government and military officials are mentioned by name as alleged key players in the narco-trafficking in Guinea-Bissau. Since their names are already public information, I have decided to include this data in the essay. On the structural scale, one must consider the power relations and the prevailing Western norm in the world order system. Said (1997:3-9) has written extensively on the Orient as *the Other*—a presumed antipole of Europe in the eyes of the European beholder. Said (1997:22-23) explains that the Orient cannot speak for itself in accordance with Europe; hence a Westerner must unveil the mysteries of the Orient to the world. The underlying assumption is that the Westerner is a real human being unlike the Oriental; thus the Westerners are in their exclusive right to own, and consume the resources of, the rest of the planet (Said 1997:109). A similar attitude towards Guinea-Bissau may or may not be prevalent in some of the sources that isolate this nation as a narco-state or a failed state. Since this study makes use of these sources, adding to that a theory that labels Third World states predatory under certain circumstances, it could even be argued that this essay exists within that context. As mentioned by Berdal (2009:174-177), what seems to be a failed state from a Western perspective, might simply be an alternative type of state formation. Currently, polarization may be caused by the US *war on drugs* discourse. In the 1980s, the USA launched a military campaign against drug production and trafficking, where foreign states are blamed for the US drug problem (Grayson 2003:147-153). This serves the nationalistic political purpose of distinguishing the virtuous American identity from that of the morally corrupt outsiders, the ‘others’, he argues. The USA now exerts hegemonic imperial power in a unipolar world order maintained by international law, according to Iadicola (2011:126-141). As depicted by US Colonel Van Riper (2014:1, 16), the UN and the USA (namely, the US Department of State and the US Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]) have officially labeled Guinea-Bissau a narco-state in 2013. Van Riper (2014:v) also encourages US involvement in Guinea-Bissau, which he describes as an epicenter of transnational drug smuggling destabilizing the entire West African region, with implications for global security. In other words, there could be more or less hidden agendas within the research literature.

5. RESULTS

5.1 Enriching at the expense of the people

This theme comprises of the criteria: *the state is run by elites seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the population, while governmental responsibilities and public interest are neglected*. In my understanding, it is comparable to corruption (in this case, particularly narco-corruption), weak institutions (including law enforcement), and a shortage of public services and infrastructure. These characteristics of Guinea-Bissauan society will be featured in the following paragraphs.

As explained by Van Riper (2014:11), the political system in the democratic republic of Guinea-Bissau is winner-takes-it-all. Unfortunately, such a system prevents the development of checks and balances but spurs corruption (Van Riper 2014:11). In accordance with Madeira et al. (2011:9):

Political legitimacy is a façade and /--/ has been /--/ the past decades /--/. The local political and military elites /--/ behave as if the country was their own personal property. A developmental state was therefore never consolidated. This situation deteriorated further with the imposition of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, leading to the virtual collapse of the state administration.

As asserted by Bybee (2011:266): "...the 'state' in Guinea-Bissau exists only as an avenue for personal enrichment for those with access to it." In Guinea-Bissau, just about everyone is prone to be bribed quite inexpensively, including officials and authorities, due to factors such as unpaid salaries, unemployment and poverty, Bybee (2009:7) argues. Political instability, in which the strong and well-organized army plays an important part, is typical of Guinea-Bissau (Gibert 2009:627). As exemplified by Bybee (2011:196), following independence, several presidents, yet most notably João Bernardo Vieira, tried to soothe enemies amongst the military by offering high positions at state agencies. However, these 'strong men' refused to play second fiddle and institutional factionism ensued, she explains. Hence, even in independence, the lack of robust institutions still prevails (Bybee 2011:266).

The Guinea-Bissauan state fails to deliver basic public services such as security, governance, justice, rule of law, health care, social services, and due wages to military and civil servants, Bybee (2011:266) asserts. As maintained by Madeira et al. (2011:10):

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 173 out of 182 countries in the Human Development report of 2009. /--/ Corruption and crime may present itself as a socially acceptable solution and as a means of survival in a society where around 66% of the population live below the national poverty line /--/. [U]nemployment is pervasive and civil servants are only sporadically paid a meager salary with which to provide for their families.

Van Riper (2014:12) apparently shares these concerns: "...approximately 20-30% of rural households [are] considered food insecure." There is no mains electricity, only the wealthy have access to running water, and most people cannot afford a bus ticket (Vulliamy 2008).

In Guinea-Bissau, structural causes such as poverty, unpaid wages, unemployment, corruption, impunity, and lack of a robust economy, make a perfect breeding ground for illicit drug trade (Bybee 2011:289-290; Madeira et al. 2011:11). People grasp any opportunity for personal enrichment (Bybee 2009:7-10). The Guinea-Bissauan people have never put much faith in the political elite, but lately it has become blatantly clear that high government officials are motivated by drug revenue rather than seeing to the will and the needs of the people, according to Bybee (2011:198-199). Still, people in Guinea-Bissau are generally way more alarmed by the unemployment and unpaid salaries, than the state-level drug-trafficking. Yet the latter situation has had the unfortunate side effect of attracting 'bad will' internationally, with implications for the inflow of foreign aid, she declares.

According to Van Riper (2014:15), Guinea-Bissau suffers from a lack of law enforcement capabilities. In this respect, Bybee (2009:10) argues:

Perhaps the most important aspect /--/ is the weak institutions, many of which have never gained legitimacy in the eyes of the population or been held accountable for their actions. The police, for example, are numerous yet under-resourced. /--/ [The] many civil servants create a huge burden on the public budget, leaving next to nothing for investigations and operational activities associated with drug interdiction. The Judicial Police, for example, have 60 agents, one vehicle and often no fuel. As a result, when culprits are apprehended they are driven in a taxi to the police station. They just recently received six sets of handcuffs from the UK, which were badly

needed. The sad picture these anecdotes paint is the unfortunate reality in Guinea-Bissau, where the near absence of a judicial system allows traffickers to operate unimpeded.

It is not uncommon for West African police to be deprived of basic equipment such as communications technology, vehicles, fuel, handcuffs and office supplies (UNODC 2007a:12). Guinea-Bissauan police are also short of phones, electricity, paid salary, and boats for patrolling the coastline (UNODC 2008a:5-6). Most police officers cannot swim or shoot a gun. Guinea-Bissau presumably lacks manpower and infrastructure to conduct a trial and there are no functioning prisons; a house with open doors and no security could serve as a prison. Due to this resource scarcity, there is no way the local police could possibly tackle prosperous criminal organizations (UNODC 2008a:5-6). The well-to-do drug traffickers can afford satellite phones, fast boats, flashy cars and paid-for protection (UNODC 2007a:1).

5.2 Lacking military legitimacy

This theme consists of the criteria: *there was never any incitement for domestic legitimacy as a basis for military power, since the military and policing structures had been obtained from the colonial power.* The focus is on military power as emphasized in the first part of the definition, even though policing structures could also be impacted by colonial legacy according to Green and Ward's (2004) theory. In Guinea-Bissau, the military is basically in charge. The following sections will explore how this could be.

Guinea-Bissau was colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, as explained by Van Riper (2014:9-10). He argues that:

Unfortunately, Portugal was not interested in developing its colony, only in exploiting it. Over five centuries Portugal failed to build a strong local government or even to unite the /--/ state /--/.

A remnant of the liberation war in 1963-1974 and the civil war in 1998-1999, there is rather a sizable armed force in Guinea-Bissau (UNODC 2007a:14). In 2005 there were some 5,100 military personnel in full-time active service, which is a considerable amount in relation to the entire population of 1.6 million (UNODC 2007a:12-14). As clarified by Van Riper (2014:10-11), the Guinea-Bissauan military was lionized as a reward for its contributions to the nation during the liberation war. This compensation has created a next-to untouchable military elite,

receiving special treatment according to the national constitution, he confirms. The military is a strong institution within the state, and feels entitled to shape the politics of the nation (Van Riper 2014:10-11; Bybee 2011:79). In addition to the political field of the government, the military also tampers with the judicial field, since there is no separation of power in Guinea-Bissau, according to Madeira et al. (2011:12). Thus, the government is unable to tackle military reform (UNODC 2007a:14). Any post-conflict attempts at DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) have proved unsuccessful in Guinea-Bissau, according to Gibert (2009:628). Army reformation is a very sensitive issue and it is tacitly understood, that there is no genuine will on behalf of the army to stop meddling in Guinea-Bissauan politics, she asserts.

There is also an ethnic component to consider, Bybee (2011:79-80) maintains. The *Balanta* comprise 80% of the military, but merely one fourth of the population. They were marginalized by the Portuguese colonial power which blocked this ethnic group from participating in the state apparatus, and largely excluded from political power even after the war of liberation. This tension urged many a coup leading up to the internal strife in 1998-1999 (Bybee 2011:79-80).

As argued by Van Riper (2014:11):

Guinea-Bissau's government is a democratic republic where the President holds a majority of the legitimate power, but where the military holds ultimate power. During its 40 years as an independent state there has been a constant struggle between the Parliament, the President and the military elite. Historically the President trumps the Head of Parliament at every encounter, and the military deposes the President whenever he grows powerful enough to challenge it. /--/ No elected president has ever completed a term in office. All but one have been deposed by the military /--/.

Shaping the government and the military to its liking has been made possible to the military elite by the distortion of the national budget towards the defense sector, which receives 30% of the governmental funding (Van Riper 2014:11). Yet, even though the entire military budget amounted to US\$ 7.5 million in 2003, the majority of the soldiers were paid a mere US\$ 400 yearly (UNODC 2007a:14). Van Riper (2014:12-13) explains that the lack of economic opportunities available in society, spurs competition within the armed forces; hence it furthers military involvement in illicit drug trafficking. As confirmed by Bybee (2009:10): “[a]nd for

an overly militarized society whose soldiers' salaries the government cannot pay, it is no wonder the military is deeply complicit in the [drug] trade.”

5.3 Lacking territorial control

This theme illustrates the porous borders and lack of territorial control in Guinea-Bissau, along the predatory state criteria of: *the entire territory of the nation is usually not controlled*. The geographic features and accessibility have proven decisive factors in the relocation of cocaine trafficking to Guinea-Bissau, as will be displayed in the subsequent paragraphs.

In approximately 2005, Guinea-Bissau suddenly emerged as a major drugs hub for the illicit trade of cocaine out of South America on route to Western Europe (Bybee 2011:abstract [no page]; UNODC 2007a:3). More intense surveillance has hampered other smuggle routes from Latin America to Europe, especially the Caribbean cocaine channels through Panama or Jamaica (Vulliamy 2008; UNODC 2007b:6). As illustrated by Vulliamy (2008):

/--/ [T]he West African coast can be reached across the shortest transatlantic crossing from South America: either by plane from Colombia, with a re-fuelling stop in Brazil; or by ship from Brazil or Venezuela. The boats leaving South America travel only by night, remaining motionless by day, covered in blue tarpaulins to avoid detection from the air. The journey can be completed in four to five nights travelling this way.

Madeira et al. (2011:9) elaborate on this topic:

/--/ [T]he vessels tend to travel along the 10th parallel north /--/. The British and Spanish navies have made so many cocaine seizures along this Atlantic band that European law enforcement agencies have nicknamed it 'highway 10'.

When nearing in on Guinea-Bissau, the main vessel could drop anchor, while the cocaine is reloaded on to smaller fishing crafts with West African crews supervised by Spaniards or Latin Americans (Vulliamy 2008; UNODC 2007a:19). The unloading could also be made via drop in a bay, or by landing on an airstrip long since abandoned during prior conflicts (Vulliamy 2008). The geographic location of Guinea-Bissau is a dream-come-true for contraband purposes, he maintains. As explained by Madeira et al. (2011:9):

/--/ [T]he shores of Guinea-Bissau provide magnificent conditions for the unloading of illegal cargo. The country is composed of the mainland, the Bissagos Islands (88 islands, of which only 20 are inhabited) and various coastal islands.

These islands serve as hubs for illicit drug trade, Van Riper (2014:14-15) affirms. Guinea-Bissau has so called porous borders and cannot govern its territory, including the coastline and archipelago, for lack of staff and resources. The geographical features include dense forests and massive mangrove swamps (Van Riper 2014:14). Vulliamy (2008) explicates:

'A place like Guinea Bissau is a failed state anyway, so it's like moving into an empty house.' /--/
One rusty ship patrols a coastline of 350km, and an archipelago of 82 islands. The airspace is un-patrolled.

Guinea-Bissau is the single most important entry point, but other states in West Africa are transit nations for cocaine trafficking as well (UNODC 2008b:11, 23-24).

5.4 Unsustaining economy

The fourth theme debates the unsustainable economic situation, in relation to the criteria of: *the economy is typically dependant on foreign aid, natural resources and illegal trade.*

Indeed, in the next sections the economy will be exposed as reliant on foreign aid, agricultural products and illegal trade.

Guinea-Bissau is a crop-producing country focusing on the export of the cashew nut, yet in reality the nation is totally reliant on foreign aid, as affirmed by Madeira et al. (2011:4, 9). Such poverty and lack of opportunities could make a population susceptible to crime and corruption (Madeira et al. 2011:4-10). As claimed by Madeira et al. (2011:4), even before the cocaine boom there was a trafficking situation:

Guinea-Bissau is well-known in the region for the illegal trafficking of small arms. High-ranking government and military officials have been directly involved. Over the past five or six years, the illegal arms trade seems to have diminished only to be replaced by the trafficking of cocaine, involving, in particular, military actors.

According to Madeira et al. (2011:4), it has even been suggested that the Guinea-Bissauan government deliberately capitalizes on the illicit cocaine trade by emphasizing the extent of the problem, in an attempt to receive more foreign aid.

Between the years of 2005 and early 2007, 33 tons of cocaine in total was seized on its way to Europe from West Africa (UNODC 2007a:3). As shown by Falkehed (2011), as much as one third of all cocaine that reaches European soil has supposedly gone through West Africa, with Guinea-Bissau as a focal point. UNODC (2007a:3, 28) paints quite a similar picture:

Based on an analysis of seizures in Europe where the origin was known, it is estimated that some 27% (or some 40 tons) of the cocaine consumed annually in Europe is presently transiting West Africa. This amount is worth about US\$ 1.8 billion at wholesale level. /--/ The entire national budget of the government of Guinea-Bissau is just about equal to the wholesale value of 2.5 tons of cocaine in Europe. /--/ Although the entire profit margin of cocaine trafficking is unlikely to stay in Africa /--/.

Van Riper (2014:12) declares that cocaine worth a whopping US\$2 billion transits Guinea-Bissau each year, four times the nation's GDP (gross domestic product). Hanson (2007), on the other hand, estimates that cocaine amounting to US\$ 150 million enters Guinea-Bissau each month. Mungai (2015) mentions that between the years of 2003 and 2008, the foreign exchange reserves of Guinea-Bissau went from US\$ 33 million to US\$ 174 million, which cannot be explained either by inflow of foreign direct investment or aid.

Once in Africa, it is unclear if the drugs remain under South American control while secured by West Africans, or if the stockpiled goods are sold on the open market already—most likely, both methods are in operation (UNODC 2007a:20-21). In the long run, the impact of drug trade on the economy of Guinea-Bissau and the amount of the influx of dirty money will be determined by whether or not the transiting cocaine remains under Latin American control, or if it is sold on the wholesale market when in Africa, Madeira et al. (2011:12-13) explain.

5.5 Fusing state structures with crime

The fifth and final theme explores the existence of the captured state, the most extreme form of the predatory state. As this sub-chapter shows, in Guinea-Bissau there is ample evidence of

every single one of the components within the captured state: *the state is organized strictly for profit-making ventures, political power is vital to individual gain, it is no longer possible to distinguish between state officials and organized criminals, state building relies on organized crime such as illicit drug trade, and the state may provide a safe haven for criminals.*

Goudsmid et al. (2011:155) claim that in Guinea-Bissau, senior politicians and military both are allegedly involved in large-scale drug trafficking. Bybee (2009:10-11) establishes as fact:

To add fuel to the fire, many state officials (the military in particular) are highly complicit in narco-trafficking. Military personnel are known to collude with Colombian drug traffickers and both have been arrested by the Judicial Police.

Government officials on all levels are compliant in the drug trade, as confirmed by Van Riper (2014:15). They are bought by drug traffickers, who wish to circumvent the law by seeing to that it is not enforced (Bybee 2011:289-290).

As highlighted by Van Riper (2014:15), the military in Guinea-Bissau is deeply involved in the drug trafficking and part of the problem. For instance, military premises are used to stockpile drugs on route to Europe (Ellis 2009:191-192). According to the UNODC (2013:16), it has been claimed that: "...drug flights land on public roads with the protection of the army." The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (2015) cautions that it has not been properly established if the entire army, or solely individual soldiers, partake in the illegal drug trafficking.

Bybee (2011:232) sets the point in time for the then Army Chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie's first involvement in Guinea-Bissauan cocaine trafficking to 2005. This is slightly before the moment when the former President João Bernardo Vieira arose as his competitor on the drug trafficking scene, she affirms. Bybee (2009:11) asserts that President Vieira's political comeback from exile in 2005 was made possible through extensive military support; hence Vieira was not prone to intervene against narco-trafficking. Presumably, Vieira was elected president due to an alliance with the military, granting Tagme Na Waie full control of the military in return for protection (Bybee 2012:11; Bybee 2011:231-232). Mungai (2015) agrees: "[i]n 2005, Colombian drug traffickers reportedly financed the lavish re-election

campaign of President João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, ‘effectively placing him and his country at the service of drug traffickers’.”

In fact, it has been argued that the top three key players in drug trafficking in the emerging narco-state were Army Chief General Tagme Na Waie, President Vieira, and the then Interior minister Baciro Dabó in Vieira’s government (Bybee 2011:183). Before Vieira’s participation, Tagme Na Waie might have been the leading man of the illicit trade (Bybee 2011:232). Van Riper (2014:15) illustrates the drug spurred competition: “[a]s Vieira and military leaders struggled for power between 2005 and 2008 the huge funds associated with drug trafficking enabled the struggle and kept other parties, with fewer funds, out.” Bybee (2011:258) explains: “[c]ocaine has raised the value placed on positions of power in Guinea-Bissau, since those in power almost automatically have direct access to drug revenues.”

As claimed by Van Riper (2014:15), the former President of Guinea-Bissau, Vieira, viewed: “...the growing drug trade as a way to improve his, and the country’s, economy.” Bybee (2009:10) elaborates: “[e]ven at the institutional level the revenue to be derived from illicit trafficking can compensate for the utter destitution of some government entities.” Yet, Bybee (2011:290) argues, drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau is allowed by individuals who decline their duty to intervene against the illicit cocaine trade, not by institutions. On this issue, Van Riper (2014:8) disagrees as he relates that: “...illicit drug trafficking in West Africa /--/ has become institutionalized and so entrenched that it is essentially a part of each country’s economy, making a huge, though unofficial, contribution to national income.”

As recapped by Vulliamy (2008), in the capital of Guinea-Bissau, cocaine induced wealth has visibly transformed society:

/--/ [T]he drug wealth was everywhere. From the air, you can see the Spanish hacienda villas, and the obligatory black four-wheel-drives are everywhere, with the obligatory scantily-clad girl, James Bond style. /--/ Among the destitute locals are scores of wealthy, gaudy Colombian drug barons in their immodest cars, flaunting their hi-tech luxury lifestyle, with beautiful women on their arms. Outside Bissau city are exclusive Hispanic-style haciendas with wide verandahs, turquoise swimming pools and gates patrolled by armed guards.

There is a permissive environment for illicit drug trade in Guinea-Bissau (Bybee 2009:10). The weak institutions and ineffective law enforcement sector provide criminals with an

opportunity to operate with impunity (Bybee 2009:7). The Guinea-Bissauan judges are often forced by the military to release drug traffickers, which are under military protection (Madeira et al. 2011:10). As explained by Bybee (2009:10-11): "...because the police are so impotent, the culprits are often held for just a few hours before senior military personnel suddenly attain extraordinary judicial powers to demand their release." There have been instances when the police made large cocaine seizures, only for the military to intervene by confiscating the goods—even bringing it to the Ministry of Finance on one occasion—which subsequently disappeared along with the arrested Latin American drug trafficking suspects (Bybee 2011:228-229; UNODC 2007a:15). Several high officials in the government were implicated (UNODC 2007a:15). Contrarily, the former head of the Guinea-Bissauan Judiciary Police, Mr. Orlando da Silva, the subject of much international praise for his work against drug trafficking, was summarily discharged in June 2007 (UNODC 2007a:15). As depicted by the UNODC (2013:16):

/--/ [S]oldiers beat and humiliate the police publicly. /--/ Journalists, police, judges, military officers, and even the highest elected officials have been kidnapped, killed, or cowed if they dared to challenge the traffickers. Traffickers too have fallen prey to their rivals.

On the morning of March 2nd 2009, the then President of Guinea-Bissau, João Bernardo Vieira, was killed only hours after the sudden assassination of Army Chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie, his mortal enemy, the evening before (Bybee 2011:226; Pallister 2009). Both the 'strong men' of Guinea-Bissau were wiped out in almost an instant (Vernaschi 2010). As explained by Poolgreen and Cowell (2009) and Bybee (2011:226), President Vieira was shot dead by supposed army troops in what appears to be an act of retaliation for the assassination of Army Chief General Tagme Na Waie the night before. Allegedly, the double eliminations followed as a result of the contest regarding cocaine revenues, according to most experts (Bybee 2011:228-229). However, as claimed by Bybee (2011:79, 230-231), the dual assassinations could also be down to old rivalries, merely exacerbated by the drug trade. In Guinea-Bissau, there was violent conflict long before narco-trafficking ever entered the scene (Bybee 2011:255-256). The UNODC (2013:9) reasons along the same lines: "[w]hile the conflict appears to have occurred along well established political fault lines, competition for cocaine profits raised the stakes and augmented tensions between rival groups."

On June 5th 2009, Baciro Dabó, the former Interior Minister in Vieira's government turned presidential candidate, was killed alongside Helder Proença, the former Minister of Defense under Vieira (Bybee 2011:182-183, 227). Allegedly, Dabó was the third most important player in narco-trafficking, while Proença was also rumored to be involved in the drug trade. The military police committed the killings. Presumably, the main motive behind these assassinations was to stop Dabó from becoming the next president of Guinea-Bissau, since then he might impede military control over cocaine revenue, or even target the armed forces that attacked and killed the former President Vieira (Bybee 2011:182-183, 197, 227).

With the new 2009 regime, cocaine trafficking reportedly decreased, presumably due to less visibility rather than actual decline (Madeira et al. 2011:5). On April 1st 2010, there was a coup attempt aiming for military power (Bybee 2011:185-186). The then-Deputy Head of the military General Antonio Indjai and the former Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, overthrew the Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and Chief of Staff General Jose Zamora Induta. Indjai assumed Induta's place, with Bubo Na Tchuto for deputy. Bubo Na Tchuto—supposedly one of the first Guinea-Bissauans to be involved in drug trafficking due to his former position as a Navy Chief with control of the waters and coastline—was freshly back from his getaway to Gambia after a failed coup attempt against the then-President Vieira and Tagme Na Waie in 2008. At the time, Bubo Na Tchuto had presumably attempted and failed to regain control of the drug trade. Reportedly, the 2010 incident was also spurred by cocaine induced competition, since Chief of Staff General Induta had been regarded as a threat to military power due to his genuine belief in SSR (security sector reform) and his will to reduce the military's involvement in the drug trade (Bybee 2011:185-186). As a result, the European Union (EU) redrew their ongoing SSR program, since Indjai and Bubo Na Tchuto were both perceived as deeply mixed up in the drug trade (Madeira et al. 2011:5-6). At this point, drug trafficking was once again conducted openly, they maintain.

In April 2012, Chief of Staff General Indjai seized power of Guinea-Bissau, to block Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior's candidacy for president (Madeira et al. 2011:5-6; The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2015; Van Riper 2014:13). The 2012 military coup was most likely triggered by government and military competition for resources and power, where the former had sought to minimize the influence over drug trafficking by the latter (Van Riper 2014:13-15).

Bybee (2011:266) concludes that the military and criminal justice sectors are captured by drug traders. Drug traffickers are infiltrating state structures in Guinea-Bissau, using threats and bribes (UNODC 2008a:5). But these sectors never fulfilled their functions, so there is no alteration of state capacity due to the narco-corruption (Bybee 2011:266). Since the state provided little security and rule of law to begin with, the state has not been captured by organized crime, it is more like the government elites allow illicit drug traders to operate freely (Bybee 2011:289-290). The UNODC (2008:1) stresses the gravity of the West African situation:

Drug money is perverting the weak economies in the region. In some cases, the value of the drugs being trafficked is greater than the country's national income. /--/ These states are not collapsing. They risk becoming shell states: sovereign in name, but hollowed out from the inside by criminals in collusion with corrupt officials in the government and the security services. This not only jeopardizes their survival, it poses a serious threat to regional security because of the trans-national nature of the crimes.

6. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

6.1 Analysis and discussion

The state crime approach of Green and Ward (2004) is applicable to the case of Guinea-Bissau in many ways. For starters, the study has established that Guinea-Bissau is indeed a sovereign state, corresponding to the theory of Green and Ward (2004). In Guinea-Bissau, the state has the monopoly of violence (that is, there is no ongoing armed conflict), civil society exists and there are democratic elections. That is not to say that everything works smoothly within the state of Guinea-Bissau. For instance, in accordance with Green and Ward (2004), the concept of the legitimate monopoly of the usage of force involves components of territorial control and institutions of coercion (for instance functional prisons). In Guinea-Bissau, these areas face severe challenges. Furthermore, in contrast to Green and Ward's (2004) concept of legitimacy; there are legitimacy issues regarding the role of the military, the police force and the government in society.

Nevertheless, the booming narco-trade in Guinea-Bissau is an organizational type of crime, along the lines with the theory of Green and Ward (2004). Allegedly, government and military officials both are deeply complicit in the illicit drug trafficking, according to a vast number of sources. As stipulated by the theory of Green and Ward (2004), in these cases there is commonly an overlap between personal gain and organizational goals. These characteristics are also present in Guinea-Bissau, where state agencies are financed with drug money to avoid bankruptcy. Hence, Green and Ward's (2004) concepts of corruption *as a means* and corruption *as an organizational goal* are indeed visible in Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, the rent-seeking seems institutionalized. There is also ample proof of a joint trafficking endeavour between state and military elements and external drug traffickers for personal benefit. In short, there is substantial evidence that profit-making has become the main concern of the state apparatus in Guinea-Bissau. This is indicative of a *total state capture*, as described by the theory of Green and Ward (2004). In Guinea-Bissau, corruption is endemic. For those in power, there are many loyalties to cater to why cocaine revenue comes in handy, as exposed by this study. An example is the late President Vieira's alleged alliance with the armed forces prior to his return to the presidential post in 2005, at the onset of the drug boom. Vieira's election campaign was reportedly financed by drug revenue. At the same time, the availability of cocaine revenue has raised the price tag for positions of power within the state.

As maintained by Green and Ward (2014), institutions challenged by organizational state crime may be at odds with each other, or even internally split between so called sub-units. This is also true for Guinea-Bissau. The study displays that Guinea-Bissauan police, government, judiciary and military are indeed deeply conflicted—sometimes over revenues, sometimes whether the illicit drug trade should be sustained or put to an end. For instance, there is a clash between the government and the military for cocaine profits. At the same time, the military and the government both deliberately cripple the law enforcement capacity of the police and the judiciaries. Also, law enforcement and government officials are being paid to 'look the other way', instead of maintaining law and order. In a similar fashion, there are apparently separate factions also *within* these institutions in Guinea-Bissau. Some sub-units fight each other for revenue, while others are for or against the illicit drug trade or simply not involved. In the former case, there was the stand-off between high rank military leaders Tagme Na Waie and Bubo Na Tchuto. In the latter case, the former President Vieira was allegedly in favour of the drug trade, but the successive regime of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and Chief of Staff General Jose Zamora Induta presumably against it, as the

drug trade seemingly declined. Furthermore, the entire Guinea-Bissauan military may not be involved in cocaine trade.

Many of the abovementioned practices and activities by the state may indeed be considered deviant and conduct norm-breaking by civil society, which is another prerequisite of the theory of Green and Ward (2004). The vast media and UN coverage on Guinea-Bissau as a narco-state, also indicates that similar denunciation took place. The existence of criminal activity within the organization of the state, such as corruption and illegal drug trafficking, is a signifier of organizational deviance. The separate components of drug trafficking and corruption has been thoroughly described in empirical sources regarding Guinea Bissau, yet never in relation to organizational deviance.

In addition, the study reveals that Guinea-Bissau fits Green and Ward's (2004) description of a *predatory state* to a tee. As portrayed by several authors in the study; Guinea-Bissau cannot control its borders, corruption is endemic, most of the underlying difficulties regarding legitimacy and/or weakness of institutions (including the military) stem back to colonial times, and the economy is largely dependent on natural resources (in actuality, the agricultural product of the cashew nut), foreign aid, and the illicit trade of cocaine. These traits are commonly found in predatory states, according to Green and Ward (2004). In predatory states, self-enrichment is all that matters to the state elites, as explained by Green and Ward (2004). This is evidently the case in Guinea-Bissau, by judging from the manifold depictions. Due to the alleged close association between Guinea-Bissauan military, government and South American narco-traffickers in regard to the illicit cocaine trade; there is substantial proof that organized crime and state elements have actually joined forces in Guinea-Bissau. In their theory, Green and Ward (2004) describe a scenario where state institutions and criminal elements have become indistinguishable. At that point, the predatory state has reached its most extreme form of *the captured state*, they argue. However, in Guinea-Bissau there are no indications that South American drug barons have actually assumed office, according to this study. Hence, the state is not literally captured; it is more of an influence. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissauan state and military actors allegedly cooperate with, and facilitate the activities of, external cocaine traffickers for mutual personal gain. As depicted by Green and Ward (2004), when the state is transformed into an organization of self-enrichment, it is yet another sign of *the captured state*. According to the theory of Green and Ward (2004), an additional sign of *the captured state* is that political power equals personal benefit. This is also the case

in Guinea-Bissau, where the immense personal profits made possible by illicit cocaine trade are available to anyone in a position of power within the state. This recent development has raised the stakes for state power and fuelled the ages-long tensions between the armed forces and the government in Guinea-Bissau. Also, in line with the prerequisites for *the captured state*, Guinea-Bissau has become something of a haven of impunity for drug traffickers. Despite the abundant coverage in the empirical sources of characteristics reminiscent of the predatory state; supposedly, there has not yet been one single report on the actual predatory state (in line with the theory of Green and Ward [2004]) in Guinea-Bissau in relation to drug trade or narcostatization. Previous research within the fields of the deviance approach and African state crime has odds-on never explored anything even remotely close to the emergence of the predatory state in Guinea-Bissau. Within the deviance approach, Evertsson (2015), Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002), Green (2005) and Green et al. (2007) have performed case studies on various topics ranging from electoral fraud in Colombia, criminal practices of the World Trade Organization regarding the construction of a dam in Thailand, natural disasters in Turkey, and the nexus of illegal and legal logging in Tasmania. In state crime, Mullins and Rothe (2007), Rothe et al. (2008), Hoofnagel (2011), Lenning and Brightman (2009), Israel (1998), and Ezeonu and Koku (2008) have looked at various African human rights violations including genocide and sexual abuse. Hence, my study seemingly breaks new ground within state crime research.

Weaknesses of the theory of Green and Ward (2004) could be that drug trafficking is indeed illegal, not merely a deviant act breaking a normative rule. Furthermore, civil society (domestic and international media, international organizations such as the UN and the EU, et cetera) clearly objects by exposing Guinea-Bissau as a narco-state. Yet this name-dragging of Guinea-Bissau through the mud seemingly carries little weight in comparison to the immense amount of revenue made available to state officials from the illegal cocaine trade. The only noticeable sanction in the examined time period appears to be the withdrawal of foreign aid. The EU induced SSR effort was also withdrawn. However, when considering the rampant competition between state officials for cocaine revenue; the latter sanction was presumably of little concern to the majority of Guinea-Bissauan leaders. Moreover, the human rights element of Green and Ward's (2004) theory is chiefly evident in the study of Guinea-Bissau in the sense that the development of institutions, liberties and goods has been held back. There is, however, also some narco-violence. Additionally, several characteristics of the predatory state consign these nations to the Third World; there is the hampered military legitimacy with roots

in colonialism, combined with the economic dependency on foreign aid, natural resources and illegal trade, et cetera. Indeed, in line with Green and Ward's (2004) theory, industrialized or transitional nations are not labeled predatory; they are referred to as capitalist states.

Sandwiched between these two extremes are the state-capitalist states. This choice of terminology could implicitly be regarded as establishing industrialized nations as the norm; at least, it tacitly implies a dichotomy between a capitalist or state-capitalist state and a predatory state. Yet state crimes, which might well be considered predatory or voracious in everyday vocabulary, are committed by all types of nations.

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, I'd like to argue that the booming cocaine trafficking and the subsequent narcostatization have largely materialized in the emergence of the predatory state. When compared to the various definitions of the narco-state by Paoli et al. (2009) (a recap of the traditional meaning) and Jordan (depicted by Bybee, 2011), and that of my own, it is also established that Guinea-Bissau could in fact be considered a narco-state, since most, if yet not all, criteria are fulfilled. State elites are indeed complicit in the illicit drug trade, and the nation appears principally dependent on drug income. As a result, the availability of ample cocaine revenue in Guinea-Bissau since approximately the year of 2005 has almost certainly intensified the pre-existing situation regarding weak institutions, widespread corruption, the lack of domestic legitimacy for the military sector, unsustainable economy, and attempts to organize the state for personal benefit. To some extent, corruption, weak institutions and structural poverty were always present in Guinea-Bissau. Until the mid-2000s, the state excelled at small arms trafficking. Yet, the narco-trafficking proved a venture of never-seen-before magnitude. Illegal trade has since become a major source of income, a characteristic along the lines of Green and Ward's (2004) theory of the predatory state. Porous borders and impunity have provided the perfect environment for drug trafficking. Despite the contributory factors, the introduction of large-scale trafficking of cocaine to the European market remains the decisive moment, when it comes to the rising of the predatory state in Guinea-Bissau.

7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Conclusion

This study reveals that Green and Ward's (2004) approach to state crime may effectively be applied in order to shed light on the recent emergence of the predatory state of Guinea-Bissau. In 2005, Guinea-Bissau became a major transit nation for illicit trade of cocaine out of South America to Europe. In fact, as demonstrated by the analysis of the study, I primarily consider the materialization of the predatory state to be nothing but a consequence of the large-scale cocaine trafficking and subsequent narcostatization of Guinea-Bissau. In Guinea-Bissau, there is no border control, the economy is largely dependent on illicit cocaine trade and foreign aid, corruption flourishes, and the underlying difficulties regarding legitimacy and/or weakness of institutions (including the military) are traceable back to colonial times. State elites hold on to political or military power in order to draw revenue, at the expense of the people. These are characteristics of the predatory state, as stipulated by the state crime theory of Green and Ward (2004). Some of these features have prevailed over time, but were aggravated by the massive scope of the drug trade. More so, there is ample evidence of a captured state—that is, the predatory state in its most extreme form. In this scenario, high-ranking state and military officials have joined forces with external drug traffickers for organizational and personal profit, creating a safe haven for criminal activity. For this reason, state elements and transnational organized crime are intrinsically linked together in Guinea-Bissau.

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